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Abstract

What Determines Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment:
An Empirical Research

by
Qiaoli Yu
Claremont Graduate University: 2019
The rise of Chinese multinational enterprises (CMNEs) and the growth of Chinese outward
foreign direct investment (OFDI) have been two important trends in the world economy. This
dissertation aims to deliver a complete picture of Chinese OFDI by investigating what determines
Chinese OFDI. Based on a perspective of international political economy, we use a multilevel
framework which includes country level, industry level, and firm level to demonstrate a reciprocal
relationship between the Chinese government’s political benefits and CMNEs’ economic benefits.
The Chinese government plays the role of an organizer in this relationship to guarantee its political
benefits and enlarge CMNEs’ economic benefits. We argue that taking advantage of such a
reciprocal relationship and the role played by the Chinese government is an important motivation
for Chinese OFDI. We generalize seven situations in which CMNEs’ OFDI could benefit from the
reciprocal relationship and the role of the Chinese government. These situations include: CMNEs
make OFDI in countries that are friendly to the Chinese government; CMNEs make OFDI in
countries that have more Chinese contracted projects; CMNEs make OFDI in countries that have

more Chinese OFDI stock; CMNEs make OFDI in countries that are suitable for production
transfer; CMNEs make OFDI in countries that are good at technology development; CMNEs make
OFDI in countries that are politically stable; and CMNEs make OFDI in countries that have
difficulty in debt repayment. According to these situations, we derive seven hypotheses to test to
what extent CMNEs take advantage of their reciprocal relationships with the Chinese government
and the role of an organizer played by the Chinese government. A dataset consisting of 175
countries from 2003 to 2016 and regression models are used to test these hypotheses. We find that
Chinese OFDI is more attracted to countries with a higher level of partnership with China, more
Chinese contracted projects, more Chinese OFDI stock, and more advanced technologies. We have
determined that Chinese OFDI uses different strategies in different groups of countries. Chinese
OFDI is more likely to go to countries with the combination of higher manufacturing capacities
and lower labor costs among OECD countries and developed countries. Chinese OFDI is more
likely to go to countries with more natural resources among middle-income and low-income
countries. We do not find evidence of Chinese OFDI’s preference for countries with higher
political stability and higher debt levels. In general, our findings give some support to our argument
that CMNEs take advantage of their reciprocal relationship with the Chinese government and the
role of an organizer played by the Chinese government.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) has been being discussed frequently in
different contexts. For example, the concerns on Chinese OFDI have been expressed by foreign
government officials for security reasons and by non-governmental organizations for
environmental reasons. Besides that, Chinese OFDI has attracted attention from academia. It is
regarded as a stimulus within the field of international business (IB) because the novel
phenomenon of Chinese OFDI could be the source of new theories (Clegg & Voss, 2018). It is
also demonstrated as an approach for China to pursue desired assets and advantages and thus
promote domestic economic growth (Knoerich, 2017). As the volume of Chinese OFDI keeps
rising, the popularity of the discussions on Chinese OFDI will continue.
The Chinese government has been trying to take advantages of OFDI to enlarge China’s
global influence and upgrade domestic industries. For example, Chinese OFDI in infrastructure
and the subsequent operation of infrastructure in host countries, which not only improve the living
quality of local people but also generate considerable amount of jobs, make China more and more
popular among the countries from the African Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
and the Latin American Integration Association. Besides that, OFDI in manufacturing allows
China to transfer production and corporate acquisition enables China to collect desirable
technologies efficiently. To guarantee and increase the benefits from OFDI, the Chinese
government has been continuously adjusting and clarifying its OFDI related strategies and policies
based on the international circumstance and domestic situation. These strategies and policies could
be either obstacles or assists to CMNEs’ OFDI activity. It would be shortsighted for the Chinese
government if CMNEs are simply used as tools to achieve its own goals. In the long term, the
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Chinese government will have accesses to more powerful and dependable tools if CMNEs can
achieve sustainable development.
Despite their great growth in terms of the volume of OFDI, CMNEs have drawn criticisms
that their revenue mostly comes from the domestic market (Alon, Wang, Shen & Zhang, 2014)
and the home country is the primary source of their competitiveness where they could take
advantages of low labor costs and environment standard (Buckley & Hashai, 2014; Hashai &
Buckley, 2014). Rugman and Li (2007) predict that CMNEs are very likely to be regional rather
than global because CMNEs fail to develop the strong firm-specific advantages such as the
advanced technology and management found in the multinational enterprises from developed
countries (DMNEs). As time goes on, the domestic market for CMNEs becomes saturated and the
domestic labor cost rises. Whether CMNEs can really go global is going to be an unavoidable
question if they want to pursue further development or maintain rapid growth. Although the answer
to this question has remained unclear, the Chinese government’s involvement in Chinese OFDI
must be an indispensable part in the answer because of the huge influence of the Chinese
government on CMNEs. The traditional supports from home country governments such as
subsidies and concessional loans had helped CMNEs survive in the international competition. New
form of government support is highly needed if the Chinese government intends to promote the
internationalization further.
In recent years, the Chinese government has announced the Belt and Road Initiative and Made
in China 2025. CMNEs have been accused of eroding labor standards and damaging the
environment in host countries for a long time. These OFDI-related grand plans raise further worries
about Chinese OFDI. The worries are mainly reflected in the issue of debt trap and technology
acquisition. It is imperative for the host countries of Chinese OFDI to investigate whether these
2

worries are based on facts or simply anti-China propaganda. The opportunity for economic
development should be undesirable at the cost of national sovereignty and security.
More than a decade ago, the most influential research on Chinese OFDI was conducted by
Buckley (2007). He successfully figured out several determinants of Chinese OFDI but failed to
explain well his finding that Chinese OFDI prefers the countries with lower political stability. Low
political stability is always associated with policy instability and violent riots, which could greatly
hurt business operation. His attributing CMNEs’ unexpected preference to CMNEs’ low capital
cost and China’s political culture turns to be farfetched. It is not easy for CMNEs to borrow in
domestic financial market as before and the relationship between central planning and market
mechanism has been rebalanced in China. CMNEs’ operation is being more and more like western
MNEs’ operation. Recently, he has admitted that he cannot find other research that makes huge
progress on the topic of Chinese OFDI (Buckley, 2018). The lack of a milestone on China’s OFDI
does not imply that there are no scholars working on it. Instead, dozens of scholars from different
parts of the world have been exploring Chinese OFDI in recent years. On one hand, each of their
studies only focuses on one or some aspects of Chinese OFDI and thus is too parochial to depict
the whole profile of Chinese OFDI. On the other hand, these studies provide clues and insights
which are indispensable and instructive pieces to the puzzle of Chinese OFDI. Comprehensive
research seems highly desirable if it can organize existing literature well and demonstrate more
features of Chinese OFDI.
This dissertation aims to provide a comprehensive and profound understanding of Chinese
OFDI. A rare but highly anticipated multilevel framework is adopted (Alon, Child, Li and
McIntyre, 2011; Deng, 2012; Deng, 2013; Lattemann, Alon, Spigarelli and Marinova; 2017). Such
a framework not only helps demonstrate the institutional effect of the Chinese government on
3

CMNEs’ OFDI decisions from top to bottom but also provides national level determinants with
more microfoundations. Referring to the determinants of Chinese OFDI figured out by Buckley
(2007), we try to find some new determinants of Chinese OFDI based on the reciprocal relationship
between the Chinese government and CMNEs and the role of an organizer played by the Chinese
government. From a perspective of international political economy, we generalize and analyze
several situations in which such relationship and role could affect Chinese OFDI. Our findings
support that the CMNEs take advantages of home country government in OFDI activity.
Futhermore, this dissertation includes the two frequently discussed issues of debt trap and
technology acquisition and gives some implications on both of them.
The next chapter is a literature review on Chinese OFDI. It covers conventional OFDI theories,
OFDI theories focusing on emerging markets and China and the perspectives of international
political economy which could be applied to the analysis of Chinese OFDI. Chapter 4 conducts a
multilevel analysis of Chinese OFDI. China’s OFDI related national strategy and industrial policy
are discussed respectively at the national level and the industry level. At the firm level, we
investigate the entry model and form of OFDI adopted by CMNEs. After that, we derived ten
hypotheses of Chinese OFDI based on the multilevel analysis rather than conventional OFDI
theories. Chapter 5 tests these hypotheses after introducing the method to test them. Chapter 6 is
the conclusion of this dissertation.

4

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Conventional OFDI Theories
At the very beginning, international business (IB) scholars put forward OFDI theories based
on their observation on the internationalization of multinational enterprises from developed
countries (DMNEs). The Uppsala model (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977) which describes
internationalization process and the eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1977, Dunning, 1979; Dunning,
1980) which points out three decisive advantages in the internationalization of multinational
enterprises (MNEs) are the two forerunners of OFDI theories. In the Uppsala model, MNEs
continuously learn experimental and market-specific knowledge in foreign markets and adjust their
commitments there based on their learning results about foreign markets. It takes time and efforts
for MNEs to understand the preference and demand of the foreign consumers who grow up in a
different cultural environment. MNEs may choose to give up a foreign market after some tentative
measures to enter this foreign market fails or formally enter this foreign market if these measures
work well. The Uppsala model is still believed to be active (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009). In the
eclectic paradigm, MNEs’ OFDI is dependent on the ownership advantages and internalization
advantages of themselves and the location advantages provided by target foreign markets.
Ownership advantages are the sources of MNEs’ competitiveness in foreign markets, which
include patents, management, reputation, etc. Sending out an internal well-trained sales team could
be even more beneficial and dependable than hiring a local agency in an overseas market.
Internalization advantages are the potential benefits of expanding business within the enterprises.
For example, setting up their own branches could help MNEs reduce management costs by
avoiding intercultural communication difficulties and setting up their own factories could protect
5

MNEs from the technology leaks. Location advantages are the advantages available to MNEs in a
specific country or region. MNEs seeking overseas production could prefer locations with lower
labor cost, lower transportation cost and larger market potential. MNEs seeking research capacity
could prefer the locations with clusters of top universities and other scientific institutions. In
addition, appropriate location choice could help CMNEs reduce the expenditure on tariff and tax.
The more advantages MNEs could exploit from an OFDI project, the more likely it is that this
project will be carried out. Dunning kept updating the eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1988; Dunning,
1992; Dunning, 1995; Dunning, 2000; Dunning, 2001) and made it a most influential theory among
OFDI theories.
Based on the Uppsala model and the eclectic paradigm, IB scholars try to explore OFDI
theory from different perspectives. These perspectives include a resource-based perspective (Peng,
2001; Barney, Wright & Ketchen, 2001), an institutional perspective (Eden, 2004; Marinova, Child
& Marinov; 2012), a global system perspective (Buckley & Hashai, 2004), an evolutionary
perspective (Cantwell, Dunning & Lundan, 2010) and a capability-based perspective (Zhang,
Tansuhaj & McCullough, 2009; Holburn & Zelner, 2010; Teece, 2014). Respectively, these
perspectives make emphases on the resource-seeking motivation of MNEs, the effect of institution
on MNEs, the introduction of formal model to internationalization theories, the co-evolution of
MNEs and exterior institutional environment and the capacity of MNEs to deal with
internationalization.
Overall, conventional OFDI theories give us some basic ideas about the process and the
motivations of MNEs’ OFDI. MNEs’ decisions on OFDI need to be cautious. Even without setting
up new branches or factories in foreign markets, MNEs could make decent profits through
international trade or licensing from these markets. New overseas branches or factories cannot
6

guarantee an increase in profits. Investigations on foreign markets are carefully conducted by most
MNEs before they decide to make more commitments in foreign markets by OFDI. Furthermore,
there are various reasons for MNEs participate in the international competition by OFDI rather
than international trade and licensing. All the three kinds of advantages in the eclectic paradigm
motivate MNEs to expand abroad by OFDI. Compared with international trade and licensing,
OFDI not only provides MNEs with the opportunity to expand international market directly but
also gives MNEs more accesses to international resources. As to those perspectives applied to the
research on OFDI, they have their own focuses and are great supplements to the Uppsala model
and eclectic paradigm.
2.2 OFDI Theories Focusing on Emerging Markets
The increasing participation of MNEs from emerging countries (EMNEs) in the international
market challenged the conventional OFDI theories above. According to conventional OFDI
theories, EMNEs should be much less motivated to make OFDI than DMNEs because they are
much less likely to exploit the three advantages of OFDI. Compared with EMNEs, DMNEs seem
unrivaled in every aspect, except the access to cheap labor. However, the access to skilled labor
could matter more to DMNEs than the access to cheap labor.
Although the fundamental difference between DMNEs and EMNEs in the exploitation of the
three advantages is commonly accepted (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Rugman, 2009; Peng,
2012; Ramamurti, 2012; Hashai & Buckley, 2014; Williamson, 2015; Williamson & Wan, 2018),
there emerged a dispute on whether new paradigms are needed to explain the phenomenon of
EMNEs (Hernandez & Guillén, 2018). On one hand, some scholars (Verbeke & Kano, 2015;
Buckley, 2018) deny the necessity of new paradigms to investigate the internationalization of
EMNEs. Institutional perspective has been popular among the scholars who want to investigate
7

the effect of home country on EMNEs’ OFDI (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau & Wright, 2000; Peng, Wang
& Jiang, 2008; He, Xie & Zhu, 2015; Huang, Ye, Zhou & Jin, 2017; Buckley, Clegg, Voss & Chen,
2018). As its name suggests, the institutional perspective is a perspective in which scholars use
either formal institutions such as governmental behavior or informal institutions such as social
custom to explain MNEs’ OFDI. The institutional perspective seems customized for addressing
the effect of active government involvement and the serious market imperfectness on EMNEs’
OFDI. For example, demanding bribes for export quotas could motivate EMNEs to produce in
foreign countries. As to other perspectives mentioned in the last paragraph, they also are applied
to EMNEs (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau & Wright, 2000; Mathews, 2002a). On the other hand, new
models that emphasize the role of learning in the process of internationalization have been
developed for EMNEs (Mathews, 2002b; Mathews, 2006; Mathews, 2017; Lu, Ma, Taksa & Wang,
2017). In addition, several new perspectives that treat EMNEs as latecomers to the international
market enrich the literature on EMNEs, such as the exploration perspective (Park & Xiao, 2017),
the springboard perspective (Luo & Tung, 2007), and the ambidexterity perspective (Luo & Rui,
2009). EMNEs are still “paying tuition” to accumulate the experience of how to internationalize
from these three perspectives.
To sum up, there is a consensus on the existence of the huge difference between DMNEs and
EMNEs but there is not a consensus on whether the difference requires new models and
perspectives. On one hand, conventional OFDI theories are comprehensively applied to explain
the phenomenon of EMNEs. On the other hand, new models and perspectives demonstrate that
EMNEs try to secure an opportunity for close observation on and firsthand experience of the
international market. As latecomers, EMNEs do not hurry to take radical steps but prefer to wait
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and see. These new models and perspectives that emphasize the role of learning in new markets
are not consistent with the eclectic paradigm but consistent with the earlier Uppsala model.
2.3 OFDI Theories Focusing on China
In recent years, compared with other EMNEs, CMNEs has been outstanding in performance
and growth and thus attracted extra attention. Not surprisingly, institutional perspective is the most
popular perspective to investigate Chinese OFDI because of the uniqueness of China’s autocratic
institution and the unexpected economic achievements with such institution. China’s political
system is said to force Chinese investors to escape from it and thus negatively promote Chinese
OFDI (Boisot & Meyer, 2008; Shi, Sun, Yan & Zhu, 2017). At the same time, China’s political
system is more often demonstrated as a positive supporter and promoter for Chinese OFDI (Voss,
Buckley & Cross, 2009; Luo, Xue & Han, 2010; Yan, Hong & Ren, 2010; Gallagher & Irwin,
2014; Duanmu, 2014; Yang & Stoltenberg, 2014; Pei & Zheng, 2015; Hillemann & Ramamurti,
2018; Holtbrügge & Berning, 2018; Torres de Oliveira & Rottig, 2018). In addition to the effect
of home country institutions on China’s OFDI, institutional perspective allows scholars to consider
the effect of host country institutions on China’s OFDI. The effect of host country institutions on
China’s OFDI varies across countries. OFDI in developed countries is more challenging for
CMNEs than that in other countries because of the stricter regulation from developed country
governments and the smaller role played by the Chinese government in more mature markets (Cui,
Jiang & Stening, 2011; Child & Marinova, 2014; Deng, Yang, Wang & Doyle; 2017).
Furthermore, scholars have begun to distinguish between state-owned CMNEs and private
CMNEs in their research (Lu, Liu & Wang, 2011; Cui & Jiang, 2012; Liang, Lu & Wang, 2012;
Duanmu, 2012; Ramasamy, Yeung & Laforet, 2012; Huang & Chi, 2014; Alon, Wang, Shen &
Zhang, 2014). From an institutional perspective, it is not difficult to speculate that these two types
9

of CMNEs are affected differently by China’s institutions. Stated-owned CMNEs are confirmed
to have more access to loans than private CMNEs (Gallagher & Irwin, 2014) and more protections
from political involvement by the Chinese government (Duanmu, 2014). The size and the location
of CMNEs are also used to distinguish CMNEs, but less common than the ownership of them
(Huang & Chi, 2014; Voss, Buckley & Cross, 2014).
Giving a priority to the institutional perspective, the literature on Chinese OFDI has covered
several topics. In their recently released review article, Alon, Anderson, Munim & Ho (2018)
generalize four of these topics: testing conventional OFDI theories, the drivers and motivations of
OFDI, entry mode choice, and location choice. Besides that, topics such as the performance of
Chinese OFDI (Deng, 2010; Zhong, Peng & Liu, 2013; Lyles, Li & Yan, 2015), the networking
of CMNEs (Peng and Luo, 2000; Chen, 2017; Hertenstein, Sutherland & Anderson, 2017), and
the challenges faced by CMNEs (Rugman & Li, 2007; Lynch & Jin, 2016) also are covered. The
last topic to be mentioned is the spillover effect of Chinese OFDI. Chinese OFDI has been found
to increase domestic productivity (Knoerich, 2014; Li, Li, Lyles & Liu, 2016). It remains unclear
whether Chinese OFDI promotes China’s exports (Lin, 2016; Lu, Lu, Zeng & Li, 2018). Chinese
OFDI is well connected with economic cooperation in Africa (Sanfilippo, 2010) and regarded as
a threat to national security and global norms among western countries (Rosen & Thilo, 2009;
Globerman & Shapiro, 2009; Rugman, Nguyen & Wei, 2014). This research on the spillover effect
of Chinese OFDI puts Chinese OFDI into a global context.
Compared with the literature on Chinese OFDI at the firm level, those at the industry level or
country level are scarce. Nolan (2014) discusses industrial policies made by the Chinese
government, which are supposed to promote the development of CMNEs. Panel data covering
different periods of time are used by several groups of scholars in their literature at the country
10
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level to figure out the determinants of Chinese OFDI (See Table 1, Buckley et al., 2007; Cheung
& Qian; 2008, Duanmu & Guney, 2009; Huang and Wang, 2011; Zhang & Daly, 2011; Kolstad
& Wiig, 2012; Zhang, Jiang & Zhou, 2014; Liu, Tang, Chen & Poznanska, 2017). The
determinants of Chinese OFDI are tested in the pathbreaking and influential research lead by
Buckley, among which the absolute market size in the host country, cultural proxy to China, the
inflation rate in the host country, the natural resources endowment of host countries, the volume
of exports from China, the volume of imports to China, and the open policy adopted in 1992 were
found to be significantly positive to Chinese OFDI and political stability is significantly negative
(Buckley et al., 2007). Most of these findings are consistent with what he expects based on
conventional OFDI theories and more or less supported by later literature, except for the finding
of political stability. In later literature, political stability is irrelevant to Chinese OFDI. (Cheung &
Qian; 2008; Kolstad & Wiig, 2012; Zhang et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2017). The evolution of China’s
institutions and CMNEs may explain to some extent why the results acquired by these groups of
scholars are inconsistent (Buckley et al., 2007; Marinova, Child & Marinov, 2011), but it is
essential to clarify such evolution itself through checking traditional determinants and searching
for new determinants. Wang, Hong, Kafouros and Boateng (2012) provide us with the only
multilevel literature on Chinese OFDI, but do not connect any two of the three levels well. The
scarcity of literature on Chinese OFDI at the industrial level and the country level has impeded the
development of the multilevel analysis of Chinese OFDI, which is seen as a more ideal framework
than any single-level analysis (Alon, Child, Li and McIntyre, 2011; Deng, 2012; Deng, 2013;
Lattemann, Alon, Spigarelli and Marinova; 2017).
To conclude, IB scholars have produced a large number of literature related to Chinese OFDI
which are mostly at the firm level and cover almost all the important facets of Chinese OFDI.
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However, these literatures are too fragmented to deliver a whole picture of Chinese OFDI. The
few national level literatures with panel data have mixed results and their data are out of date.
More national level and industry level literatures will be helpful in presenting a more complete
status of Chinese OFDI, especially those can take advantages of the existing firm-level literatures
as their microfoundations. The huge influence of the Chinese government on CMNEs makes the
institutional perspective commonly adopted. However, without a multilevel framework, we can
only discuss the effect of specific and partial political institution on China’s OFDI. There has not
any significant top-down analysis on Chinese OFDI.
2.4 Perspectives of International Political Economy
Scholars in the field of international political economy (IPE) paid some attention to the global
activities of MNEs but this attention did not last long. To call for the reconsideration of MNEs
within the field of IPE, Eden (1991) discussed the enlightening contributions made by IPE scholars.
These contributions include product life cycle (Vernon, 1966), sovereignty at bay (Vernon, 1971;
Vernon, 1981), obsolescing bargain (Vernon, 1971; Vernon, 1977), the law of uneven
development (Hymer, 1972), and the international division of labor (Hymer, 1972, Hymer, 1979).
Developing countries and MNEs from developing countries seem doomed to be suppressed by
developed countries and DMNEs in terms of the benefit distribution in the global market. In the
same year, Strange (1991) added a reason for IPE scholars to study the activities of MNEs: the rise
of MNEs and the fall of states had changed the relative power balance between MNEs and states
and enabled MNEs to play a larger role in the global stage. What’s more, Strange (1992)
emphasized the interdependence of state-state bargaining, state-firm bargaining, and firm-firm
bargaining; she pointed out that more attention should be paid to state-firm bargaining and firmfirm bargaining.
13

It took a long time for IPE scholars to recognize comprehensively the rising status of MNEs
in global governance and to demonstrate the power of MNEs (Fuchs, 2005; Fuchs, 2007, Fuchs,
2013). Finally, Mikler (2018) makes a leap when he analyzed MNEs as political actors in the
context of international political economy. It has been commonly perceived that host countries
benefit from MNEs’ OFDI in terms of capital, productivity, and employment. However, we need
to pay more attention to how home country governments achieve their political goals with help
from domestic MNEs and how MNEs achieve their economic goals through participating in
political activities.
IPE scholars have not done much work exclusively related to OFDI, but IPE scholars give us
some clues about how to put Chinese OFDI into a global context. Firstly, the theory of second
image reversed points out that international circumstance has a huge impact on domestic policy
makers (Gourevitch, 1978). International circumstance deserves being treated equally as domestic
situations in the analysis of domestic policy (Feng & Li, 1997). In this way, the involvement of
the Chinese government in Chinese OFDI is supposed to address both international and domestic
problems. Secondly, the worsening relationship between the United States and China is a threat to
further internationalization of CMNEs. The United States and its allies will remain the recipients
of most Chinese OFDI for a long time and they have been more cautious than ever about Chinese
OFDI due to national security issues. The rise of China has been perceived as a challenge among
these countries because of its large population, rapid economic growth, and emerging military
power (Tammen & Kugler, 2006). To avoid a fierce conflict with China, the United States
encouraged China to follow the western business model by integrating China into the international
community and by welcoming it in international alliances (Kugler, Tammen & Swaminathan,
2001). However, China does not seem satisfied with the status quo of the international order led
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by the United States and is trying to integrate itself into the international community by
constructing a new one. China’s challenge is to either improve investment conditions in countries
outside the United States and its allies and or to alienate these allies from the United States. The
BRI and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) are two significant examples of China’s
efforts to construct the new order. Thirdly, OFDI could be an efficient channel for China to enlarge
its global influence. International trade is said to make two countries interdependent with each
other because one country is sensitive and vulnerable to the other’s change of policy (Keohane &
Nye, 1977). Although realists and liberalists hold different ideas on the effect of the economic
interdependence brought by international trade on the bilateral relations of involved countries
(Gasiorowski, 1986; Maoz, 2009), we have reasons to believe that the economic interdependence
brought by Chinese OFDI could improve China’s relationship with host countries, especially less
developed countries. Capital dependency theory holds that foreign capital penetration could lead
to income inequity in host countries and not increase domestic productivity (Dixon, 1996). On the
contrary, the form of OFDI makes it inevitable for CMNEs to hire local laborers in host countries
and transfer comparatively advanced technology to host countries. Furthermore, Chinese OFDI in
infrastructure help less developed countries remove a main obstacle of economic development.
The lack of infrastructure is regarded as a cause of Africa’s poverty (Easterly & Levine, 1997) and
the improvement of infrastructure is much more beneficial to African countries than externally
imposed economic reform or political reform (Easterly, 2009). The more host countries benefit
from the increased jobs, productivity and infrastructure, the better the relationship China could
develop with those host countries. The improved relationship with host countries improves China’s
global influence.
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From the paragraphs above, we find that the perspectives of international political economy
have huge potential in the exploration of Chinese OFDI. The increased relative power of MNEs
makes MNEs more valuable to home country governments. Home country governments could not
only support local MNEs in the international market but also seek political benefits from local
MNEs’ OFDI activities. Furthermore, international circumstances should be taken into account
when we analyze Chinese OFDI. International circumstances constrain Chinese OFDI as well as
domestic situation and should affect the OFDI-related strategy and policy made by the Chinese
government. The mightiness of developed countries and DMNEs in the international market
motivates the Chinese government and CMNEs to work together. Lastly, whether the Chinese
government could gain global influence through CMNEs’ OFDI is not guaranteed. It is necessary
to investigate whether CMNEs’ OFDI satisfies host countries’ demand such as economic growth.
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CHAPTER 3
The Backgrounds of Chinese OFDI
3.1 An Introduction to Chinese OFDI
Gradually balanced growth could be an appropriate phrase to describe the performance of
Chinese OFDI in recent years. In the recent fifteen years, the sustained growth of Chinese OFDI
has made China one of the largest global investors in the world (see Figure 1, Figure 2 and Figure
3). However, the great leap for Chinese OFDI seems close to an end. Chinese investors have turned
to be more rational and cautious than ever and Chinese OFDI experience a rare decline in 2017.
Besides that, Chinese OFDI has been more and more balanced in several dimensions such as the
distribution of OFDI among different countries and industries and the ratio of the OFDI made by
state-owned CMNEs to the OFDI made by private CMNEs.
Figure 1: The Development of CMNEs and Chinese OFDI
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Figure 2: The Global Ranking of Chinese OFDI Flows
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Figure 3: The Global Ranking of Chinese OFDI Stock
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The rapid growth of Chinese OFDI could be observed in both width and depth. In terms of
width, China signed bilateral investment treaties with 104 countries at the end of 2016 and 190
countries or regions were the destinations of Chinese OFDI in 2016 (Ministry of Commerce of
China, 2016; Ministry of Commerce of China, 2017). Most exceptions are tiny countries that have
diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) instead of with the People’s Republic of
China. As to depth, the flow of Chinese OFDI reached its peak in 2016, which was $196.15 billion
and maintained China as the second largest global investor in that year (Ministry of Commerce of
China, 2017). With a 19.3% decline in 2017, Chinese OFDI was $158.29 billion and China fell
slightly behind Japan (Ministry of Commerce of China, 2018). This decline mainly was caused by
the actions of the Chinese government against irrational OFDI and the stricter supervision of the
acquisition of high technology enterprises in developed countries. In the United States, Chinese
OFDI decreased by 66% in 2017 (Ministry of Commerce of China, 2018). However, such a decline
in Chinese OFDI seems more like a hypercorrection of the previous great leap. The trend of
increasing Chinese OFDI should be unstoppable because China not only has the capacity to export
more capital but also because benefits economically and politically through these capital flows.

Figure 4: The Amount of Chinese OFDI to Africa, Asia and Latin Amercia
in Billion US Dollar
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Figure 5: The Continent Distribution of Chinese OFDI
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Figure 6: The Trend of Chinese OFDI in the Manufacturing Inudstry
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In recent years, Chinese OFDI has been making efforts to cultivate developing countries and
manufacturing industries. Excluding the distortion by the offshore financial center countries and
regions such as Hong Kong, British Virgin Islands, and Cayman Islands, we may observe that
CMNEs do not overlook Asia, Africa, and Latin America, which are generally poorer than North
America, Europe, and Oceania (see Figure 4 and Figure 5). At the same time, the amount of
Chinese OFDI that goes to the manufacturing industry and the share of manufacturing industry
OFDI in total OFDI has increased greatly (see Figure 6). There are mainly two kinds of OFDI in
the manufacturing industry. The first one is greenfield OFDI, in which CMNEs set up new
factories and then usually hire and train new workers for their factories. The second one is merger
& acquisition (M&A), which allow CMNEs to enjoy the technologies and brands developed by
acquired enterprises in a short time. Although the amount of Chinese OFDI through M&A has
been increasing quickly, M&A ventures are not overwhelmingly preferred by CMNEs (see Figure
7 and Figure 8). In developing countries, greenfield OFDI is more common for CMNEs. Labor
and land are cheap in developing countries. By contrast, there are many more enterprises with
popular brands, advanced technologies, and efficient management in developed countries that
could be valuable acquisitions for CMNEs. Therefore, greenfield OFDI is a more reasonable
choice for CMNEs in developing countries and most acquisitions take place in developed countries.
As developed countries become increasingly aware of the need to protect high technology, the
prospect of acquisition of enterprises in order to promote technology development remains
uncertain. The manufacturing greenfield OFDI in developing countries may be limited by issues
including environmental protection and labor standards, but should maintain overall growth
because of the improvement of investment conditions such as infrastructure.
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Figure 7: Amount of Chinese OFDI for M&A (Billion US Dollar)
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Figure 8: The Distribution of Entry Model by CMNEs
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Figure 9: The Proportions of State-owned CMNEs and Non-state CMNEs
in Chinese OFDI Stock
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The increasing participation of private CMNEs in OFDI is another phenomenon deserving
attention. Among the 500 largest private Chinese enterprises, 271 of them made OFDI in 2016 and
287 of them made OFDI in 2017 (All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, 2018). The
ratio of the OFDI made by private CMNEs to that made by state-owned CMNEs has been rising
for more than ten years (See Figure 9). How should we interpret this phenomenon? First of all, the
more active participation of private CMNEs in OFDI does not mean that the Chinese government
has lost its control over Chinese OFDI. On the contrary, it could be partly attributed to the efforts
made by the Chinese government to encourage private enterprises to go abroad (National
Development and Reform Commission of China, 2012). Ownership is far from the only decisive
factor for the Chinese government to exert huge influence over private CMNEs. We will discuss
the two channels through which the Chinese government influences the OFDI of CMNEs in the
last section of this chapter. Secondly, private CMNEs generally do not compete fiercely with state23

owned CMNEs. Private CMNEs’ strength mainly concentrates in the real estate, insurance, light
manufacturing, mining, and high technology industries (All-China Federation of Industry and
Commerce, 2018). None of these industries are oligopolies and occupied by only a few private
CMNEs and state-owned CMNEs. The rise of private CMNEs expands the competitiveness of
CMNEs to more industries and fields. Thirdly, compared with state-owned CMNEs, private
CMNEs are more dependent on firm-specific advantages including technology and management
and less dependent on government subsidies or natural monopoly. We should not be blind to the
firm-specific advantages occupied by CMNEs anymore. In sum, the rise of private CMNEs are a
great enhancement to the comprehensive development of CMNEs and the approaches for China to
enlarge its global influence.
As the stock of Chinese OFDI accumulates, CMNEs have been gathering more and more
international investment experience and international management talent. Even though the growth
rate of Chinese OFDI could slow down in the following years, we may hold a positive attitude to
the return rate of Chinese OFDI. Once Chinese OFDI becomes more and more stable, the
observation of it may give us more and more implications about the future and strategy of Chinese
OFDI.
3.2 International Circumstance
Knowing the international circumstances and domestic situation is an ideal beginning to
understanding Chinese OFDI because they are the basis for the Chinese government to formulate
OFDI-related national strategies and industrial policies. Some of these strategies and policies could
be explicit and openly announced, while others could be implicit and executed quietly. For
example, it could be speculative to announce a financing plan for the infrastructure in host
countries without providing the information about the collaterals in that financing plan. An
24

assessment of the international circumstances and domestic situation faced by China may not only
help us understand these explicit OFDI-related national strategies but also explore the potential of
those implicit strategies.
Among various international relations, U.S.-China relations are of great importance
(Friedberg, 2005; Goldstein, 2013). For the only superpower remaining in the world, a challenger
with different ideology is dangerous (Feng, 2013; Allison, 2017). The Tiananmen Square incident
eliminated the possibility that would China reform its institutions as the United States expected
and thus turned to a disaster for U.S.-China relations (Suettinger, 2003). The subsequent blockade
of science and technology on China has lasted almost thirty years in terms of the Co-ordinating
Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) and the Wassenaar Arrangement. Any
goods or technology that has the potential to improve China’s military power is not allowed to
transfer to China. During that time, China has made a lot of notable achievements by itself. For
example, China has developed the stealth jet J-20, which is regarded as the most competitive rival
for the F-22 Raptor. Besides that, China’s aircraft carrier, lunar lander, and BeiDou Navigation
Satellite System are all examples that China can independently manage great projects requiring a
huge amount of high technology. Although the blockade of science and technology on China seems
not to work very well, it is not totally useless. We may find that the traditional blockade of science
and technology is still useful in the case of ZTE in 2018. ZTE’s dependence on the chip technology
from U.S. MNEs put ZTE into a very difficult position in conflict with the U.S. government. ZTE
was not able to maintain daily production activities without U.S. chips. As a result, the U.S.
government gained a complete victory over ZTE and CMNEs gained a valuable lesson about the
necessity of independent research and development. It is hard to decide whether the blockade of
science and technology is more of a motivation or an impediment for China’s achievements in
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science and technology. Referring to the amount of R&D expenditure and the number of granted
international intellectual properties (see Figure 10 and Figure 11), the technology gap between the
United States and China should become narrower and narrower in the following decades. If this is
true, cases similar to the ZTE case in 2018 should be less and less frequent. In other words, the
effectiveness of the blockade of science and technology will inevitably decrease.

Figure 10: Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D at Current PPP
(Million US Dollar)
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Figure 11: Total Patent Grants by Applicant's Origin
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The U.S. government has developed new countermeasures to the rise of China. The blockade
of science and technology seems to have been upgraded to two-way from one-way. A two-way
blockade of science and technology against China rejects not only technology exports to China but
also technology imports from China. For instance, the United States has launched a boycott of
Huawei, a global leader in the fifth generation of wireless communications technology (5G) due
to of national security considerations. Huawei is said to stand in for the Chinese government and
fail to comply with the U.S. laws (U.S. House of Representatives, 2012). Although not expelled
from the U.S. market, high-tech CMNEs such as Dajiang and Hikvision, which have occupied
leading positions in drones and video surveillance, have led to serious discussions of whether they
stand in for the Chinese government as Huawei and thus threaten foreign countries (Mozui, 2017;
Leng, 2018). It is reasonable to expect more and more Chinese technology enterprises will be
labeled as dangerous for national security and will be subject to boycotts. No matter whether the
boycott of Chinese technology enterprises really protects the national security of the United States,
involved CMNEs will lose the world’s largest market and a decrease in revenue is inevitable.
In addition to technology imports from China, Chinese capital has been another target for the
U.S. government. The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA)
expands the jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to
investigate Chinese capital. Needless to say, CMNEs are very likely to be banned because of their
declarations of acquiring advanced technologies or sensitive information before transactions,
CFIUS now has the right to stop a transaction once CFIUS speculates that CMNEs are intended to
circumvent the jurisdiction of CFIUS in that transaction. Besides that, the review period is
expanded to 45 days from 30 days with a possible extension of 15 days. A review period of 60
days could be annoying to any enterprise with high demand for capital. There should be no doubt
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that the new act brings more risks and less attractiveness for Chinese capital investment in U.S.
enterprises. The influence of this new act on CMNEs is complicated. In the short term, CMNEs
may lose a quick approach to mastering new technology. CMNEs may be forced to increase their
expenditures on research and design in the long term and at the same time the Chinese government
may be even more determined on the issue of forced technology transfer in the domestic market
and fiscal subsidies to specific industries than before.
To make the boycott to CMNEs and Chinese capital more efficient, the United States
exercises its huge influence to make other countries join such boycotts. The more countries join
the boycott, the more effective this boycott will be. However, it remains questionable to what
extent the traditional allies of the United States are willing to join the boycott of China. On one
hand, Trump’s administration and his America First policy make the traditional allies of the United
States worry about and reconsider the prospect of their alliance with the United States. On one
hand, the United States has canceled its negotiation on the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The United
States has exited from the Paris Agreement and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization. On the other hand, the rise of China brings these traditional allies of the
United States many opportunities for cooperation with China on various issues, such as clean
energy and space exploration (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, 2018). Denying these
opportunities seems inconsistent with the interest of these countries. The Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank, which was initiated by the Chinese government, has recruited the United
Kingdom, Germany, and France as non-regional members. A multi-polarized world seems more
attractive to the European Union than a world dominated by one superpower (Lederer, 2019).
Recently, a former senior executive from the famous French multinational Alstom has released a
book about his experience of being put in jail and how Alstom was suppressed by the United States
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government in a deal with General Electric (Pierucci & Aron, 2019). His story may make European
MNEs hesitant when they are forced to choose partners between U.S. MNEs and CMNEs.
Although Japan, South Korea, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand could be easier for the United
States to wield its influence because of shorter geographic distance or significant mutual interests,
such as the nuclear threats from North Korea, we have to admit that it will be less and less likely
for these countries to give one-sided support to the United States because of the growing
attractiveness of the cooperation opportunities offered by China.
Just like the United States, China has its own traditional partnerships. Even before the
restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the United Nations in
1971, PRC had been a leader among developing countries. In the recent decade, China has been
developing its partnership with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CLACS),
African Union (AU), Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), and Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) and enlarging its influence within these areas. China’s projects have appeared as
background on currency issued in Algeria, Guinea, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan,
and Thailand (Shen, 2019). By contrast, the collapse of the Trans-Pacific Partnership cast a shadow
over President Obama’s Asia Rebalancing Strategy. Although President Trump has put forward
new Indo-Pacific Strategy and Africa Strategy, we cannot find many new approaches to promote
bilateral cooperation. The most eye-catching new approach could be emphasizing potential threats
from China such as debt trap. There is a report that the U.S. government has been sending financial
experts to help developing country governments assess Chinese OFDI projects (Kesling and
Emont, 2019). However, scholars from Boston University and Johns Hopkins University point that
China’s debt trap is unfounded. According to them, China is not the largest creditor with the
majority of debt in almost all developing countries; the amount of international capital from other
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countries is underestimated (Brautigam, 2019). Furthermore, the large amount of private
investment by U.S. MNEs may not follow the guidance by the U.S. government and stick to their
former investments in industries such as the mining industry. Although U.S. MNEs are willing to
take part in the improvement of infrastructure, CMNEs are able to offer lower price and decent
quality. It could be unreasonable to expect that the United States will crowd out China’s investment
and influence in developing countries.
To conclude, the international circumstances for Chinese OFDI are slightly positive. Chinese
OFDI in the United States could be more and more difficult, especially those intending to acquire
high technologies and involving personal information. The obstacles to Chinese OFDI in other
developed countries are being weakened because of the shrinking global leadership of Trump’s
administration and the growing economic cooperation opportunities offered by China. As to
developing countries, Chinese OFDI could maintain a stable growth in these countries for a long
time.
3.3 Domestic Situation
In addition to international circumstance, the domestic situation is another source of gist for
the national government to make OFDI-related policies and a source of motivation for CMNEs to
go abroad. Dunning (1981) relates GDP per capita in a country positively with the amount of this
country’s OFDI and points out that OFDI decisions are finally determined by the country, the
industries in this country, and the MNEs from this country. For example, MNEs from countries
with fewer natural resources and less human resources are more likely to make OFDI in order to
make up for their disadvantages. MNEs that are competitive in their own or related industries are
more likely to make OFDI in order to exploit their advantages in a larger market.
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As implied in the example above, resources are one of the main aspects when we discuss the
domestic situation of China. Generally, the huge amount of natural resources promised by the large
size of Chinese land are greatly divided by the huge population of China into a low per-capita level.
The tradition of saving is another motivation for China to get access to overseas natural resources
through OFDI. It is strategically more considerate to exploit overseas natural resources as much
as possible and conserve domestic natural resources for future use. In addition to national resources,
human resources are another important kind of resource MNEs care about. For a long time, MNEs
have benefited from cheap labor brought by demographic dividends. As time goes by, the influence
of family planning is being more and more significant. A low birth rate leads to a shrinking supply
of labor and at the same time more young people get the chance to receive better education and
develop complex skills. In other words, the supply of cheap labor will decrease and the supply of
skilled labor will continuously increase. The trend of human resources in China forces CMNEs to
deal with the problem of rising labor costs and gives advantages to CMNEs in domestic R&D.
The rising labor cost is not the only factor that drives up the domestic operating cost of
CMNEs. The formation of environmental awareness among Chinese people and officials forces
Chinese enterprises to not only pay more attention to waste disposal but also to adopt more
environment-friendly manufacturing processes. It has been more costly for any enterprise to be
labeled as an environment destroyer than to increase expenditures on environmental protection.
Besides that, land acquisition has been more and more costly in the recent decade. An enterprise
has to spend much more money than before to acquire land if this enterprise wants to set up a new
factory. By contrast, the land cost in the neighbor countries of China is much lower, especially
when local governments want to attract FDI through concessive land pricing. Increasing domestic
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operating costs must make CMNEs think about reducing such costs through OFDI activities such
as transfer of production to countries with cheaper resources and looser environmental supervision.
In addition to increasing domestic operating costs, CMNEs have to respond to the almost
saturated domestic market. Economic growth in China has been slowing for several years, and this
trend is expected to continue. To offset the slowdown of domestic demand, CMNEs may have to
exploit more potential in overseas markets, especially those of developing countries. For example,
CMNEs in the construction industry have accumulated a lot of experience and improved their
technology and management during the process of building massive domestic infrastructure. At
the same time, these massive infrastructure projects have brought governments at different levels
a heavy debt burden and made it impossible to maintain high expenditures on infrastructure (Tsui,
2011). It remains questionable whether the introduction of private capital into infrastructure can
fill the gap left by the former government expenditures. From a perspective of decreasing marginal
benefits, new infrastructure projects could bring fewer benefits to the Chinese society than before
and lead to low returns of public expenditure or private investment. It could be out of date to insist
that public expenditure in China is only about officials’ personal will because municipal peoples’
congresses have been more and more strict with local budgets. In this way, CMNEs in the
construction industry will have to seek more and more overseas projects to offset their unavoidably
slowing domestic business. CMNEs in many other industries such as the automobile industry and
the cell phone industry are also faced with slowing domestic business.
The domestic situation faced by CMNEs seems to be deteriorating in terms of labor cost, land
cost, environment regulation, and market potential. CMNEs are losing their traditional countryspecific advantages in the international marketplace. It has been essential for CMNEs to utilize
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international resources and expand international markets if they want to maintain their
development and growth.
3.4 How Does the Chinese Government Influence Chinese OFDI
Thanks to the economic reform started at the end of 1978, China has made impressive
economic achievements in the last four decades. As a result of this reform, the current Chinese
economic system is interpreted in different ways, such as socialism with Chinese characteristics,
crony capitalism (Pei, 2016), and state capitalism (Naughton & Tsai; 2015; Hung & Chen, 2018).
No matter in which way the current Chinese economic system is interpreted, the role of an
organizer played by the Chinese government in economic activities is always emphasized. With
more and more significance, Chinese OFDI is surely under the control of the Chinese government
or at least the influence of it.
To influence or control Chinese OFDI, the Chinese government mainly has two channels.
The first one is relationship and the other is capital control. The continuous reform of state-owned
and public-owned enterprises does not threaten the survival of giant central state-owned
enterprises but does affect small local public-owned enterprises. The ownership of CMNEs allows
the Chinese government to appoint the senior executives of CMNEs. These senior executives have
the motivation to carry out strategies that are consistent with national strategies because whether
they will be promoted to higher levels is decided by the Chinese government. Making the Chinese
government satisfied absolutely increases their chances of getting promoted. As to those private
CMNEs, it is essential for them to maintain a good relationship with the Chinese government
because the Chinese government offers the licenses, loans, and business opportunities that are
attractive or indispensable to private CMNEs. Behaving the way the Chinese government asks
allows private CMNEs to receive more resources from the Chinese government.
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The second channel, capital control, works like insurance to the first channel. The use of
capital control has been thoroughly discussed for a long time. However, the use of capital control
on OFDI has not attracted exclusive attention like that on capital flight or financial instability. The
capital control on OFDI once required CMNEs to report their potential OFDI projects and wait for
the approval from the Chinese government. Once any OFDI project is found to be harmful to
China’s interests and too economically or politically risky, CMNEs will not get the permission to
send money abroad and have to give up that project. In recent years, the capital control on OFDI
has been relieved by the Chinese government in order to encourage OFDI. Only those OFDI
projects involving sensitive industries and sensitive countries need to be approved before being
carried out (National Development and Reform Commission of China, 2017). These sensitive
industries include but are not limited to mass media, water resources development, and military
industries. As to sensitive countries, most of them are at war or do not have diplomatic relations
with Mainland China. Other OFDI projects may be carried out after being reported to relevant
departments. If OFDI projects involve less than US $300 million, they even do not to be reported
to the National Development and Reform Commission (National Development and Reform
Commission of China, 2017). Being reported to the provincial National Development and Reform
Commission is enough for them. The accumulation of OFDI experience is another reason for the
Chinese government to relieve capital control. CMNEs have developed stronger abilities to handle
OFDI projects and thus it is much safer than before to leave OFDI decisions to the senior
executives of CMNEs, who have the motivation to take care of the interests of both CMNEs and
the Chinese government.
These two channels enable the Chinese government to use Chinese OFDI as tools to achieve
its global ambitions and thus incur criticism of Chinese OFDI. For those who dislike the Chinese

34

government and the Communist Party of China, Chinese OFDI is messing up the world. They may
successfully find some cases in which Chinese OFDI is not welcome by host countries or does
harm to local people as propaganda materials. However, considering the amount of Chinese OFDI
projects, several case studies are not powerful evidences of what is Chinese OFDI really doing all
over the world.
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CHAPTER 4
Multilevel Analysis, Theoretical Frame and Hypotheses
4.1 China’s OFDI Related National Strategy
In the last chapter, we learned that the Chinese government has a huge influence on the
activities of CMNEs and China is faced with various challenges from both international
circumstances and the domestic situation. It could be ideal for China if the Chinese government
could develop an appropriate OFDI-related national strategy and lead CMNEs to follow such a
strategy. An appropriate OFDI-related national strategy should be able to deal with these
challenges by making contributions in the following three aspects: the enlargement of Chinese
global influence, the sustainability of domestic economy, and the development of CMNEs.
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been commonly perceived as an OFDI-related
national strategy since it was originally put forward as “One Belt, One Road” in 2013. This initiate
is not the only OFDI-related strategy in China, but most other OFDI-related strategies are at the
provincial or municipal levels. Just as the Chinese central government formulates an OFDI
national strategy based on the fundamental realities of the country and CMNEs, local governments
consider local conditions and CMNEs when they formulate local strategies. These lower-level
strategies are generally consistent with the BRI but focus more on the local economy and CMNEs.
As a national strategy, the BRI treats CMNEs as a whole and develops a master plan for
them. In the BRI, CMNEs are planned to participate in OFDI activities in two highly
interdependent channels. In the first channel, Chinese OFDI goes to the infrastructure industry
mainly through contracted projects, such as power stations, railways, and freeways. CMNEs may
acquire part or whole ownership of these projects after completion and make profits through their
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subsequent management and operation. In the second channel, Chinese OFDI is planned to take
advantage of those infrastructure projects completed by CMNEs through further investment in the
areas surrounding these projects. For example, industrial parks are planned at locations close to
the harbors operated by CMNEs. Being close to a friendly and efficient harbor could significantly
reduce transportation costs for CMNEs. In return, a huge amount of imports and exports makes
the harbors operated by CMNEs more profitable.
The example above is far from revealing the major strategy of the BRI. The BRI is far more
than a plan to promote and guide Chinese OFDI. From a perspective of globalization, the BRI is a
plan to connect the countries along the BRI more closely. Countries are connected in various
dimensions and the BRI takes advantage of these dimensions. These dimensions include policies,
infrastructure, trade, information, capital flows, and people-to-people bonds (National
Development and Reform Commission of China, 2015). The communication between countries
not only helps avoid vicious competition but also promotes cooperation and thus has a huge
influence on the quality of the connections between countries. For example, communications on
industry and trade policy may allow the division of labor among the countries with homogeneous
industry structures and thus promotes the production efficiency in the countries involved.
Communications on infrastructure could make infrastructure projects be more efficient public
goods by appropriate choice of location. In addition to the Ministry of Commerce and the National
Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is another department that
takes part in composing “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and
21st-Century Maritime Silk Road.” The participation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs implies
that the communication with host country governments is of great importance.

37

As the key to communication, partnership is not easy to build. Sharing a similar ideology is
a source of partnership, but it does not make much sense for China to develop partnership with
most countries in the world. A more practical way for China to develop partnership is to bring
more benefits and do less harm to other countries. Several groups of scholars from the World Bank
have tried to assess the effect of the BRI on the global economy and other issues. In general, the
BRI is beneficial for all countries because it saves transaction costs and promotes economic growth
(Chen & Lin, 2018; de Soyres et al., 2018; de Soyres, Mulabdic & Ruta, 2019). It could be
advantageous for China to lead project evaluation based on their domestic experience of urban
planning to make sure that local governments spend their limited money on the projects that will
bring the most benefits, especially when American experts try to discover the defects of proposed
projects. Furthermore, countries benefit differently from the BRI and the relative location of
countries in the BRI projects matters (Derudder, Liu & Kunaka, 2018; Xingjian Liu Reed &
Trubetskoy, 2019). It could be helpful for China to introduce multilateral organizations such as the
AIIB to deal with the apportionment of expenditure on public goods among countries. No countries
will be happy paying more and at the same time benefiting less. The endorsement made by
multilateral organizations could make the Chinese government more trustful. Two of the potential
harms to host countries that have been discussed the most frequently are environmental destruction
and debt trap. Construction of infrastructure at the cost of the environment and financial security
in host countries will not help develop the partnership between China and host countries. To reduce
and avoid potential harm to host countries, the Chinese government has made several
announcements to inform CMNEs the importance of non-economic factors, including cultural
differences between different peoples (Ministry of Ecology and Environment of China, 2017;
Ministry of Ecology and Environment of China, 2017; National Development and Reform
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Commission of China, 2017). President Xi Jinping confirmed the efforts of the BRI in environment
protection and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development of United Nations on the Second
Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in 2019 (Xi, 2019). Once host countries
witness the occurrence of benefits and the avoidance of harms, the partnership between China and
host country governments should begin to increase continuously.
To what extent partnership is developed by China and home country governments will
determine how successful the BRI will be. With a low level of partnership, CMNEs may only treat
host countries as production centers. A higher level of partnership between China and host
countries not only allows CMNEs to build infrastructure in the industries related to people’s
livelihood and national security (such as the power industry) but also authorizes them to manage
the infrastructure. In other words, no country is willing to be dependent on a hostile country and
partnership makes it possible for host countries to be dependent on China’s operation in host
countries. As host countries become more and more dependent on China, China surely will enlarge
its global influence. With a higher level of partnership between China and host countries, CMNEs
can transfer more domestic production to host countries and generate stable revenues through the
subsequent operation of infrastructure in host countries.
Although the BRI seems promising for China in comprehensive aspects, the BRI, by
promoting OFDI, may lead to a decrease in domestic investment. Domestic investment has been
regarded as one the most powerful engines for economic growth and thus a decrease in domestic
investment could offset all the benefits brought by the promotion of OFDI. Fortunately, scholars
have found a crowd-in effect of OFDI on domestic investment in China (Ameer, Xu & Alotaish,
2017; Gondim, Ogasavara & Masiero, 2018). According to them, CMNEs take advantage of OFDI
to develop firm-specific benefits such as technology and management and therefore make
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themselves more competitive in the domestic market. The increase of competitiveness in the
domestic market makes these CMNEs believe in their potential returns from further domestic
investment. The crowd-in effect of OFDI is even stronger in the industries receiving more support
from the Chinese government (You & Solomon, 2015). It seems that we do not need to worry
much that the BRI pushes out domestic investment. On the contrary, the BRI could pull in domestic
investment. After the BRI was put forward, the amount of FDI actually utilized and the amount of
total Investment in Fixed Assets have continued to increase stably (see Figure 12 and Figure 13).
To conclude, the BRI is designed to help China maintain its domestic economy and enlarge
China’s global influence through the international economic cooperation brought by OFDI. At the
same time, a major goal of the BRI is for CMNEs to benefit from an internal agglomeration effect
and bring CMNEs more business opportunities through government-to-government negotiation.

Figure 12 : The Amount of FDI Actually Utilized (Billion US dollar)
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Figure 13: The Amount of Total Investment in Fixed Assets (Billion Chinese
Yuan)
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4.2 China’s OFDI Related Industrial Policies
OFDI-related industrial policies are important supplements to OFDI-related national strategy,
especially in terms of the execution of national strategy. Generally, industrial policies reflect the
preference of governments for different industries and are more favorable to the industries
endorsed by governments. Specifically, OFDI-related industrial policies allow governments to
encourage and support CMNEs from certain industries to go abroad through exclusive programs
such as accelerated approval, access to loans, preferential tax rate, etc. These programs are
supposed to make CMNEs more competitive on the international stage.
“Made in China 2025” has been the most significant industrial policy document since it was
released in 2015. This document gives us a strong signal that manufacturing industry is the most
important one for the Chinese government. In this document, the backwardness of the
manufacturing industry was used to explain the fall of China over the last two hundred years and
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the capacity of manufacturing is regarded as an indispensable driving force to the rise of China.
Furthermore, the planned contribution of the manufacturing industry to the agriculture and service
industries through agricultural machinery and service-embedded manufacturing makes the core
position of the manufacturing industry more important. There should be no doubt that advanced
agricultural machinery will greatly improve agricultural production efficiency. As to serviceembedded manufacturing, it not only makes the manufacturing and service industries more closely
connected but also has great potential to improve the quality of both product and service. Producers
have their own advantages in the provision of customer service because they are knowledgeable
about their products. The dedication to customer service may help collect useful feedback for nextgeneration products. For example, as the world’s largest port machinery manufacturer, Shanghai
Zhenhua Heavy Industries, has been making advances in developing port services through port
equipment control systems and automated port terminal operating systems. Because of the core
position of the manufacturing industry, it is clear that the Chinese government will give more
support to the manufacturing industry when there are limited resources to allocate.
In addition to signaling the endorsement of the Chinese government of the manufacturing
industry, “Made in China 2025” clarifies the role of the Chinese government and Chinese
enterprises. The Chinese government is supposed to focus increasingly on the top-level design of
industry development and make enterprises as the main entities in the process of production and
innovation. In other words, the Chinese government aims to reduce its involvement with
enterprises’ operation and create an environment that is the most favorable to them. Taking
innovation as an example, the Chinese government could draw a roadmap of the most important
fields of science and the most desirable technologies based on the relevant suggestions from
enterprises and then let the enterprises lead the scientific and technical cooperation with state-
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owned research institutions and universities. The Chinese government seems doing what suggested
by Rodrik (2004) for industrial development and performing like a collaborative government. The
support given by the Chinese government includes but is not limited to special research funds,
information-sharing platforms, and risk-sharing mechanisms. In this way, the involvement of the
Chinese government in CMNEs’ operation could be more temperate, selective and flexible than
before. If it becomes true, on one hand, the increasing autonomous right may allow CMNEs to be
more agile in the international competition. On the other hand, CMNEs may benefit from more
customized supports and incentive mechanism provided by the home country government, rather
than simply low labor cost and subsidies.
Among the key strategic tasks listed in “Made in China 2025” is the internationalization of
the manufacturing industry. To complete this task, the Chinese government emphasizes taking
advantage of the international market and international resources as a part of the “Two Markets
and Two Resources” strategy. The introduction of international resources through FDI is not
enough. CMNEs are encouraged to go abroad to enter international market sand acquire
international resources such as capital, enterprises, and technologies. Simply selling products in
overseas markets is not enterprising enough. CMNEs must improve the added value of products
by developing a global marketing system and must enhance product development capacity by
setting up overseas R&D institutes. As implied in the last paragraph, the Chinese government has
committed itself to the top-level design of international cooperation, which should benefit CMNEs’
OFDI. Specifically, the transfer of production to overseas industrial parks in the countries along
the BRI is emphasized in “Made in China 2025”. Successful examples of industrial parks include
Haier-Ruba Economic Zone in Pakistan, Thai-Chinese Rayong Industrial Zone, and Cambodia
Sihanoukville Special Economic Zone (Ministry of Commerce of China, 2018).
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In general, “Made in China 2025” tells us not only the significance of the manufacturing
industry to China but also the role of OFDI in the development of the manufacturing industry and
related CMNEs. By contrast, in 2017, the Chinese government made an announcement that it
would limit OFDI in unproductive industries such as entertainment and real estate (State Council
of China, 2017). Together with Made in China 2025, this announcement reminds us of Alexander
Hamilton and Friedrich List’s legacy of national industrialization. The determination of the
Chinese government to support the development of the manufacturing industry seems
unchallenged and OFDI has been perceived as a key route.
4.3 Entry Model and Financial Structure
From the last two parts, we know that the Chinese government increasingly intends to affect
CMNEs’ operation through top-level design, which includes national strategy and industrial
policies, rather than through direct control over CMNEs’ operations. Among the numerous
decisions made by CMNEs during the process of internationalization, the entry model chosen by
CMNEs and the form of OFDI flows are two significant categories that not only happen at the very
beginning but also continue until CMNEs exit foreign markets. In this part, we will discuss
CMNEs’ decisions on the entry model and the different forms of OFDI flows.
CMNEs’ decisions on the entry model originate from their motivation to engage in OFDI and
then CMNEs have to make compromises based on internal conditions and external regulatory
requirements. No matter if OFDI is market-motivated or resource-motivated, there are more than
one option of entry model. An overseas R&D institute could be set up by either a joint venture or
a greenfield venture. It is the same for the transfer of production to overseas factories. It impossible
to make a clear conclusion that there is a single best entry model for all CMNEs. For example, the
existence of several potential local partners such as original equipment manufacturers could make
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greenfield venture less attractive. The time of setting up new factories and the recruiting cost for
new staff could be saved by CMNEs in the joint venture. However, local partners may be able to
learn simple technology quickly and therefore become local competitors in the future. To avoid
the leak of key technology, CMNEs may choose to acquire one of those potential partners. When
a problem is solved, a new problem may be created. Should Chinese managers be sent to foreign
offices to lead foreign staff or remain the executives of the acquired enterprise?
To deal with this problem, CMNEs need to assess whether Chinese managers are able to
cooperate with foreign staff well or whether current foreign executives could serve well after the
change of ownership. Simply exporting products to foreign markets has the lowest requirement for
the management level of CMNEs. The reports of lethal incidents caused by conflicts between
Chinese staff and local people or staff have been continuing, especially among those CMNEs
involve in contracted projects (Quadir, 2019). Dealing with the lack of professionals with
international business experience has been identified as a measure of support for the
internationalization of CMNEs (Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of China, 2017).
CMNEs without enough experts in international management may have to rely on foreign
executives and therefore feel unsure about acquisition.
Compared with the internal conditions applied to CMNEs’ decisions on the entry model,
those external regulatory requirements are no less challenging and complicated. Strictly speaking,
there is no totally free capital mobility. OFDI is always more or less limited by host country
governments for different reasons such as shareholding ratios and forced technology transfer. The
regulatory requirements in host countries are not fixed and vary among countries. In developing
countries, the technological achievements of CMNEs could make them victims of forced
technology transfer instead of being the beneficiaries of it. In this situation, forced technology
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transfer makes acquisition and greenfield ventures unable to avoid the leak of technology and the
joint venture is therefore more likely to be adopted for its lower cost and risk. Developed countries
have more reasons to be picky than developing countries because they have more factors to take
into account such as different ideologies, environmental protection, cultural preservation, and
ethnic diversity. Threatened by the rise of China and CMNEs, some developed country
governments could substitute the limit on shareholding ratios with various bans aimed at China’s
OFDI in the name of national security. Otherwise, new administrative interventions could be
developed just like increasingly abundant non-tariff barriers to international trade. The preference
of CMNEs for acquisition as an entry model in the United States was discouraged because
acquisition cannot generate as many new jobs as greenfield ventures do. Suggestions were thus
made to the United States government to require CMNEs to adopt greenfield ventures more often.
Chinese investors were reported to be surprised and regretful when they learned that it is illegal to
make any change to the appearance of buildings they acquired (Zhen, 2016). Their remodeling
plans for the acquired building to attract Chinese tourists fell through. Whether CMNEs are willing
or not, it seems wise for CMNEs to choose a more conservative entry model and rely on local
partners when they enter a new market with much uncertainty of external regulatory requirements.
In addition to the entry models for CMNEs to choose, there are three forms of capital flows
through which CMNEs can make OFDI. They are incremental equity, reinvested earnings, and
debt instrument investment. Each of them can help CMNEs achieve specific purposes. Equity
investment allows CMNEs to acquire partial or total ownership of foreign enterprises and therefore
enable CMNEs to affect or control the operations of these enterprises. Besides that, CMNEs may
benefit directly from the equity they acquired. By contrast, debt instrument investment does not
grant CMNEs extra right to participate in the operations of related enterprises. Instead, debt
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instrument investment is just domestic parent CMNEs’ lending to overseas branches or joint
ventures and thus seems like a more temporary form of OFDI. As to the OFDI through reinvested
earnings, it is an extension of former OFDI activities. Such an extension usually takes place
because investors are satisfied with the current operation and predict more profits in the future. If
we look into the structure of Chinese OFDI, we may find a trend that the share of the Chinese
OFDI in the form of incremental equity and reinvested earnings has been generally increasing
since 2006 (see Figure 14). Debt instruments seems less and less attractive to CMNEs. This trend
implies that Chinese OFDI is more and more interested in a long-term internationalization strategy.

Figure 14: The Structure of Chinese OFDI
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In this section, we analyze Chinese OFDI at the firm level. As successful latecomers to
internationalization, CMNEs are gradually performing more and more like the MNEs from
developed countries and experience the same challenges as the latter. The association of CMNEs
with the Chinese government leads to stricter regulatory requirements in developed markets, which
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forces CMNEs to adjust their entry model. In addition, we investigate the structure of Chinese
OFDI and find that the ratios of equity investment and reinvested earnings have been rising in
recent years. Such a structure implies that CMNEs could be more interested in long-term
development than in short-term financial returns.
4.4 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
In this section, we try to develop a theoretical framework for Chinese OFDI based on the last
chapter and the multilevel analysis in the earlier sections of this chapter and then derive seven
hypotheses to test the determinants of Chinese OFDI. We argue that taking advantage of the
reciprocal relationship with the Chinese government in which the Chinese government plays the
role of an organizer is another important motivation for CMNEs’ OFDI. Several official
documents published by the Chinese government are used as supplements to the theoretical
framework in the derivation of the hypotheses (see Table 2).
Because of the substantial influence of the Chinese government on CMNEs, CMNEs more or
less take the top-level design of Chinese OFDI made by the Chinese government into account
when they make OFDI. Especially when such top-level design is profitable for CMNEs, exploiting
the three advantages (ownership advantages, location advantages, and internalization advantages)
in the eclectic paradigm will not be the only reasons for CMNEs to make OFDI. CMNEs must try
to take advantage of such top-level design. In this way, the explanatory power of the eclectic
paradigm could decrease and it turns to be appropriate to explain Chinese OFDI with a reference
to the top-level design of Chinese OFDI.
The essence of the top-level design of Chinese OFDI is a reciprocal relationship between the
Chinese government’s political benefits and CMNEs’ economic benefits. The Chinese government
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关于建立境外投资重点项目风险保障机制有关问
题的通知

关于对国家鼓励的境外投资重点项目给予信贷支
持政策的通知

境外投资项目核准暂行管理办法

文件名

Notice of Enhancing the Support to Major Overseas
Investment Projects on the issue of financial insurance

Notice of Establishing Risk Protection Mechanism for
Major Overseas Investment Projects

The Interim Measures for the Administration of
Confirmation and Recordation of Overseas Investment
Projects
Notice of Giving Credit Support to the Key Overseas
Investment Projects Encouraged by the State

Name of Document

2009

2006

2005

2004

2004

Year

Partnership

Contracted projects, production transfer, natural
resources and political stability

Technology, production transfer, natural resources

Technology, natural resources, production transfer and
political stability

Technology, natural resources, production transfer

Focuses

Table 2. OFDI Related Official Documents Released by the Chinese Government

关于进一步加大对境外重点项目金融保险支持力
度有关问题的通知

Measures for the Administration of Overseas Investment
Projects

Political stability

境外投资管理办法

2009

关于完善境外投资项目管理有关问题的通知

Contracted projects and natural resources

Political stability

2010

2011

Partnership and political stability

Political stability

2011

Technology, partnership and agglomeration effect

2010

Notice of the National Development and Reform
Commission on Issues Concerning the Improvement of the
Administration of Overseas Investment Projects
Some Suggestions to the 12th Five Year Plan

中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十二个
五年规划的建议
对外投资合作境外安全风险预警和信息通报制度

Notice on Decentralizing the Approval Authority of
Overseas Investment Projects

2011

Notice on Issuing the Overseas Security Risk Early
Warning and Information Release System of Foreign
Investment Cooperation
Interim Measures for the Supervision and Administration
of Overseas State-owned Assets of Central Enterprises

国家发展改革委关于做好境外投资项目下放核准
权限工作的通知

Guiding Opinions on Promoting the International
Development of Strategic Emerging Industries

中央企业境外国有资产监督管理暂行办法

关于促进战略性新兴产业国际化发展的指导意见

Strategic assets and production transfer

National strategy and industry policy
2012

Comprehensive

2012

2014

Partnership

Measures for the Supervision and Administration of
Overseas Investments by Central Enterprises

2014

Comprehensive

中央企业境外投资监督管理暂行办法

Measures for the Administration of Overseas Investment
Projects

2016

Partnership, strategic assets, natural resources,
production transfer

关于鼓励和引导民营企业积极开展境外投资的实
施意见

境外投资管理办法

A Five Year Plan for Promoting the Internationalization of
Small and Medium Sized Enterprises

2017

Notice on Issuing the Implementation Opinions on
Encouraging and Guiding Private Enterprises to Actively
Conduct Overseas Investment
One Belt One Road Initiate

促进中小企业国际化发展五年行动计划

Notice on Further Directing and Regulating the Direction
of Overseas Investments

一带一路

关于进一步引导和规范境外投资方向的指导意见
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utilizes its global influence and industrial policies to help CMNEs expand their global business
and at the same time CMNEs’ global business helps the Chinese government enlarge its global
influence and deal with domestic political tasks. The Chinese government could enlarge its
influence in host countries if CMNEs successfully improve and operate local infrastructure and
create local jobs. The Chinese government could also be relieved from the pressure of
environmental pollution if CMNEs transfer production to other countries, replenish the National
Social Security Fund from the profits gained by state-owned CMNEs, promote industrial
upgrading and secure domestic energy consumption. As to CMNEs, they benefit from the
reciprocal relationship no less than the Chinese government. The business opportunities identified
by the Chinese government could not only increase CMNEs’ revenue but also give CMNEs access
to international resources and grant CMNEs the management right of profitable projects. The
involvement of the Chinese government reduces CMNEs’ transaction cost by making negotiation
more efficient when the Chinese government has a high level of partnership with host countries.
In addition, the Chinese government does not force CMNEs to sacrifice their economic benefits.
CMNEs are not required to finance overseas aid projects. The Ministry of Finance is supposed to
finance these projects, which could be a source of revenue for CMNEs. CMNEs are required to
stay away from unstable countries or areas to avoid economic losses (State Council of China, 2017).
The official prohibition against environmental damage in host countries could be interpreted as the
Chinese government’s effort to guarantee its political benefits rather than CMNEs’ sacrifice of
economic benefits.
In the reciprocal relationship, the Chinese government plays the role of an organizer. As an
organizer, the Chinese government focuses on two tasks. The first one is to promote cooperation
between CMNEs and host countries and cooperation among CMNEs. To promote cooperation
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between CMNEs and host countries, the Chinese government learns about the demands of home
country governments and then figures out how to turn these demands into business opportunities
for CMNEs. For example, a hydropower station not only could help expand electricity
consumption in host countries but also benefit the Chinese operators of this hydropower station
and the surrounding Chinese factories. Cooperation among CMNEs is more complex. It could be
creating positive agglomeration effects for CMNEs and allowing CMNEs to utilize Chinese
contracted projects. There could be no significant distinction between working in an overseas
industrial park developed and operated by CMNEs and working in China. In this way, CMNEs not
only save transportation costs but also overcome the liability of foreignness to some degree. In
some situations, the Chinese government promotes cooperation among CMNEs by coordinating
the production and strategy of CMNEs. For CMNEs that aim at the international market, the
Chinese government tries to help them avoid competition among themselves by coordinating on
the differentiation of them or merging them. By contrast, CMNEs that focus on domestic markets,
such as those from the mobile communication industry or petroleum industry, are required to
maintain a substantial competitive relationship with each other. The second task is to give more
support to the CMNEs in the key areas of national development. In other words, this task is to
motivate CMNEs to make more contributions to the development of China and consolidate the
reciprocal relationship. The Chinese government has made a clear statement on the importance of
the manufacturing industry to China in its industrial policy document “Made in China 2025”.
CMNEs’ OFDI could not only help CMNEs acquire desired technology in the short term but also
enlarge their research capacity in the long term. The more the CMNEs in the manufacturing
industry benefit from OFDI, the more quickly China could achieve further industrialization. The
effective execution of these two tasks requires the Chinese government to have high political
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capacity. Political capacity is put forward to demonstrate governments ’ability to carry out their
tasks or achieve their goals (Organski and Kugler, 1980). One of the examples in which the
Chinese government’s high political capacity contributes to its political task is China’s family
planning (Feng, Kugler and Zak, 2002). A government with high political capacity should capture
the following features: the ability to gather and utilize human and material resources efficiently
(Arbetman & Kugler, 1997); clear strategic direction; supportive organizational culture and
effective accountability relationships (Rand Corporation, 2014). The last chapter and the earlier
part of this chapter suggest that the Chinese government has high political capacity and therefore
could play the role of an organizer well.
The reciprocal relationship seems beneficial for China but threatening to some other countries.
The issue of China’s debt trap is brought about by the worry that the Chinese government could
control the economies of host countries through CMNEs and enables CMNEs to exploit huge
advantages in host countries. Although the loans provided by the Chinese government to host
countries are rarely associated with political prerequisites, the terms of these loans often include
collaterals such as natural resources and the management right to local infrastructure. These
collaterals could be so profitable that the Chinese government may prefer debt default to timely
repayment.
Here we generalize seven situations in which CMNEs could take advantage of the reciprocal
relationship between the Chinese government’s political benefits and CMNEs’ economic benefits
and the role of an organizer played by the Chinese government in this relationship: CMNEs make
OFDI in countries that are friendly to the Chinese government; CMNEs make OFDI in countries
that have more Chinese contracted projects; CMNEs make OFDI in countries where they have
more Chinese OFDI stock; CMNEs make OFDI in countries that are suitable for production
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transfer; CMNEs make OFDI in countries that are good at technology development; CMNEs make
OFDI in countries that are politically stable; and CMNEs make OFDI in countries that have
difficulty in debt repayment. Below we derive seven hypotheses from these seven situations and
explain how the reciprocal relationship and the role of an organizer work in these situations. The
operationalization of testing hypotheses will be presented in the next chapter.
Hypothesis 1: Chinese OFDI is more likely to go to countries that have a higher level of partnership
with China.
Economic cooperation is formed more easily and efficiently in host countries with a higher
level of partnership with China. The partnership we discuss here is political partnership which
could reflect the level of mutual trust and the efficiency of communication. CMNEs are
encouraged to participate in the international economic initiatives led by the Chinese government,
such as the BRI, and thereby take advantage of the negotiations between the Chinese government
and the host country governments. China’s partnership with host countries could be strengthened
if CMNEs’ OFDI has a positive impact on host countries. There has been a study which
demonstrates a positive role of government diplomacy for CMNEs. Whether there is a bilateral
investment treaty and the number of diplomatic visits between China and host countries are found
to have a positive relationship with the amount of Chinese OFDI in host countries (Zhang et al.,
2014). This hypothesis uses the level of partnership as a proxy to the diplomatic relationship
between China and host countries and we believe it is a better choice. Diplomatic visits may not
be able to promote Chinese OFDI in host countries but bring host countries foreign aid, especially
diplomatic visits between China and low-income countries. China has signed bilateral investment
treaties with more than 100 countries, including all the main destinations of Chinese OFDI. Having
a bilateral investment treaty with China should not give many advantages to host countries to
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attract Chinese OFDI. By contrast, the level of partnership tells us about the degree of difficulty
in forming economic cooperation between China and host countries. Partnership is not bivariate
and thus allows us to observe the effect of it with more precision. With a higher level of partnership,
it is more likely for China and host countries to develop economic cooperation and further
cooperation on the issues related to national security and people’s livelihood. In other words,
CMNEs could gain more business opportunities in countries with a higher level of partnership
with China.
The partnership between China and host countries could be divided into five levels from the
worst to the best: no diplomatic relationship; basic diplomatic relations; basic partnership; strategic
partnership; strategic cooperative partnership. OFDI in countries with no diplomatic relationship
is strictly regulated (State Council of China, 2017). In countries with a basic partnership, the
Chinese government is not involved in Chinese OFDI and Chinese OFDI is purely for economic
considerations. The countries with a strategic partnership provide China with strategic assets,
which are mainly the natural resources and advanced technology and are willing to cooperate with
China on the issues such as national security and people’s livelihood. The involvement of the
Chinese government in CMNEs’ OFDI is supposed to guarantee China’s accesses to these strategic
assets. As to the countries with strategic cooperative partnership, the Chinese government can
communicate with the governments of these countries efficiently and work together for a win-win
result. The involvement of the Chinese government in Chinese OFDI plays an important role in
these countries.
Hypothesis 2: Chinese OFDI is more likely to go to countries where there are more Chinese
contracted projects.
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The planning of Chinese contracted projects not only considers the demands of host countries
but also those of CMNEs. Chinese contracted projects are supposed to improve the investment
environment for CMNEs in terms of power supply, medical treatment, transportation, etc. At the
same time, CMNEs are encouraged to take advantage of Chinese contracted projects. A classical
model of utilizing Chinese contracted projects is Chinese overseas industrial parks. CMNEs that
have expertise in infrastructure and construction build the industrial parks for other CMNEs, which
have plans for new factories in these industrial parks. Making full use of Chinese contracted
projects enhances the returns of Chinese contracted projects. CMNEs could be the operators of
Chinese contracted projects and benefit financially. If not, host countries’ satisfaction with the
returns of Chinese contracted projects will make Chinese contracted projects more popular and the
negotiation of Chinese contracted projects easier. In this way, a positive circle of Chinese
contracted projects and Chinese OFDI will be generated.
Hypothesis 3: Chinese OFDI is more likely to go to countries that have more Chinese OFDI stock.
CMNEs are encouraged to go abroad together (Ministry of Commerce of China, 2018).
Going abroad together allows CMNEs to create and benefit from agglomeration effects. Cheung
and Qian (2008) find that Chinese OFDI takes advantage of agglomeration effects in terms of
Chinese OFDI stock. The explosive growth of Chinese OFDI in the last decade strongly weakens
the timeliness of their research. Furthermore, the concentration of OFDI stock years ago could be
explained by the limited number of OFDI projects and the parochialism of international business
experience, rather than an active exploitation of agglomeration effects.
Active exploitation of agglomeration effects turns out to be practical as the number of OFDI
projects increases in a certain country or area. Taking overseas industrial parks as an example, the
CMNEs in the same industrial park can share a group of security guards or a huge dining hall.
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What’s more important, improving infrastructure for a single CMNE could be as costly as for a lot
of CMNEs. Being well planned, a railway not only benefits the CMNEs at the two destination
stations, but also all the CMNEs along the railway. Therefore, this hypothesis reinforces the last
hypothesis. Making CMNEs benefit from Chinese contracted projects is not enough for the
Chinese government. The role of a perfect organizer is to make the most CMNEs benefit from
Chinese contracted projects at the least cost. It is much more cost efficient for a cluster of CMNEs
to benefit from Chinese contracted projects than a single CMNE.
In addition, the stock of Chinese OFDI in a country could imply the accumulation of business
experience and networks in that country. The non-competitive and cooperative relations between
CMNEs enables them to share their experience and network with other CMNEs. Both such
experience and network could propel CMNEs’ business, especially for newcomers.
Hypothesis 4: Chinese OFDI is more likely to go to countries with a combination of larger
manufacturing capacity and lower labor costs.
Both the Chinese government and CMNEs benefit from CMNEs’ production transfer and the
Chinese government gives the most support to the CMNEs that transfer their production through
OFDI. Through production transfer, especially comparatively low-end production, the Chinese
government could be relieved from the pressure of environmental protection to some extent. In
addition, production transfer must create local jobs in host countries. If these jobs pay well and
offer a decent working environment without producing much pollution, the Chinese government
would be appreciated by host countries. In return, CMNEs that transfer production through OFDI
could not only utilize cheap laborer or lands in the host countries but also become the largest
beneficiaries of the agglomeration effects discussed above. The CMNEs in the service industry
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cannot benefit much from the grand construction of infrastructure projects such as power supply,
highways, and ports.
Host countries with a combination of large manufacturing capacity and low labor costs could
be the most ideal destinations for production transfer. Larger manufacturing capacity implies that
it is more likely for CMNEs to find eligible laborers and suitable local partners. These local
partners could be either original equipment manufacturers (OEM) or component and material
suppliers. The advantage of low labor costs is even more obvious. The missing of either low labor
costs or high production capacity makes a host country less attractive to the CMNEs that want to
transfer their production. Therefore, we adopt a combination of manufacturing capacity and labor
cost in this hypothesis. We admit that more factors are considered when CMNEs make the location
choice of OFDI, such as accesses to markets and tariff barriers. Manufacturing capacity and labor
costs should be the two factors that are the most directly related to the motivation of production
transfer or the two prerequisite factors of production transfer.
Hypothesis 5: Chinese OFDI is more likely to go to countries that have more advanced
technologies.
Acquiring overseas technologies is a clear purpose of Chinese OFDI. On one hand, it is a
political task for the Chinese government to upgrade domestic industries quickly by acquiring
overseas technology. On the other hand, CMNEs need to develop their firm-specific advantages
to make themselves competitive in the international marketplace. Acquiring overseas technology
is a shortcut for CMNEs.
The reciprocal relationship between the Chinese government and CMNEs on the issue of
technology development is explicitly embodied in the national military-civilian integration
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strategy (Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development of China, 2018).
CMNEs’ technology development should make huge contributions to the whole society and to
national security. To motivate CMNEs to acquire desirable technology through OFDI, the more
Chinese society and national security benefit from CMNEs’ acquired technology, the more support
the Chinese government will give to CMNEs. This support includes but is not limited to subsidies,
concessional loans, and tax reduction.
However, the prospect of acquiring overseas technology through Chinese OFDI is unclear
because of the increasing caution in industrialized countries about CMNEs’ acquisition of
domestic high-tech enterprises and even CMNEs’ funding to finance domestic research institutions.
Recently, University of California, Berkeley and Oxford University have banned new research
projects that are funded by Huawei (Delaney, 2019). Acquiring overseas technology seems not an
easy task for CMNEs anymore.
Hypothesis 6: Chinese OFDI is more likely to go to the countries with higher political stability.
This hypothesis contradicts Buckley’s finding that Chinese OFDI prefers countries with less
political stability (Buckley et al., 2007). According to him, CMNEs overlook political risks
because of low capital cost and China’s political culture. Most subsequent studies do not confirm
this conclusion (Cheung & Qian, 2008; Huang & Wang, 2011; Zhang et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2017).
Kolstad and Wiig (2012) point out that Chinese OFDI could choose to bear some political
instability for the sake of natural resources. Although it is true that state-owned CMNEs enjoy low
capital costs in the domestic market and there are less political obstacles for CMNEs to make OFDI
in countries with similar ideology or political system as China, there are more reasons to challenge
the conclusion that Chinese OFDI prefers political instability. Firstly, it has been much more
difficult for CMNEs to get loans in the domestic market. On one hand, the recreational activities
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provided by CMNEs to bank officials is strictly prohibited (Manion, 2016). On the other hand,
CMNEs are required to deleverage by the Chinese government (State Council of China, 2016;
National Development and Reform Commission of China, 2018). With less investable money
available, CMNEs have to be more careful about their OFDI. Secondly, the Chinese government
does not push CMNEs to countries with low political stability for its own political benefits and has
made more than one announcement to emphasize the risk management of OFDI (National
Development and Reform Commission, 2005; Ministry of Commerce of China, 2010). The
executives of CMNEs must pay much more attention to political instability in host countries than
before. Otherwise, they will miss the chance to get promoted or even be demoted or dismissed.
Thirdly, the comprehensive development of CMNEs allows them to compete with DMNEs in
countries with good investment environment and affluent resources instead of countries with poor
investment environment and inadequate skilled laborers. It turns to be more practical for CMNEs
to stay away from political instability than before because CMNEs have more choices now.
Fourthly, the form of equity investment and reinvested earnings have been increasingly adopted
by CMNEs to make OFDI. As we discussed in the part of entry model and financial structure,
these two forms of OFDI focus more on long-term benefits than short-term benefits. To secure
long-term benefits, it is wise for CMNEs to avoid political instability. Last but not least,
government changes brought about by political instability create uncertainty in the domestic
economy, especially those irregular government changes such as coups (Feng, 1997). After an
irregular government change, the new government could abolish the planned Chinese OFDI
negotiated between the Chinese government and its predecessors and refuse to compensate
involved CMNEs. Therefore, it is likely that Chinese OFDI now prefers countries with higher
political stability.
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Hypothesis 7: Chinese OFDI is more likely to go to countries with higher debt level.
This hypothesis supports the charge that the Chinese government sets a debt trap in the host
countries of Chinese OFDI. Higher debt level is usually associated with a bad economic situation
and thus deters FDI. If Chinese OFDI flows to countries with higher debt level, Chinese OFDI
should have a special strategy. The rationale of the debt trap is that host countries overborrow from
China to finance grand infrastructure projects because the Chinese government intentionally
exaggerates the potential benefits of proposed projects and then have to hand over some collaterals
because of insolvency. The collaterals are usually key economic infrastructure such as power
stations, railway and ports and the important source of fiscal revenue such as mines and oil fields.
A healthy debt level gives host countries a buffer to protect themselves from uneconomic
infrastructure projects. The higher debt level host countries have, the more likely for these
countries to lose collateral. Acquiring the collateral must greatly benefit CMNEs in terms of
operational costs and material costs and thus promotes CMNEs’ OFDI. Although the rationale of
a debt trap seems plausible, the charge that the Chinese government sets the debt trap is not
necessarily true. It is reasonable that such a charge is used as a countermeasure by anti-China
forces to hinder the increasing global influence of China.
The establishment of the AIIB could be a significant fact that reduces the possibility of
China’s debt trap. As a multilateral bank, all members of the AIIB are the lenders of its projects;
sometimes private capital and other multilateral banks such as the World Bank and the Asia
Development Bank are included as co-lenders. When China is not the only lender of a project and
other lenders are introduced, the transparency of the financing plan for projects must be clear to
international society. Compared with the number of projects financed independently by Chinese
banks, the number of projects funded by AIIB and its co-lenders remains small. If the AIIB
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develops quickly under the leadership of the Chinese government and leads to a decrease in the
number of projects financed independently by Chinese banks, it is very likely that the Chinese
government will not have a strategy of debt trap. Otherwise, the establishment of the AIIB could
be just a cover for China’s debt trap.
The verification of this hypothesis has significant policy implications. If Chinese OFDI is
found to be more directed to countries with higher debt level, the host countries of Chinese OFDI
must be extremely cautious about any financing plan proposed by China. As a result of setting up
debt traps in the host countries of Chinese OFDI, the Chinese government and CMNEs may have
some political and economic benefits in the short term but more diplomatic difficulties in the long
term. Partnership is one of the things that are much easier to destroy than build.
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CHAPTER 5
EMPIRICAL TESTING
5.1 Variables and Data
The operationalization of dependent variables, control variables and independent variables
is presented in Table 3 and the correlation of these variables is presented in Table 4.
Dependent variables: Chinese OFDI
We use the amount of Chinese OFDI that goes to host countries as a proxy for Chinese OFDI.
It is in current US dollars.
This proxy is aggregated by different types of OFDI. Therefore, the results of a control
variable or independent variable could reflect the mix of different types of OFDI. For example, the
significance of natural resources is more or less reinforced by OFDI flows that seek for market
expansion or go to manufacturing industry.
Control variable 1: Market Size
Market seeking is perceived as one of the most basic motivations for MNEs to internationalize
themselves. With appropriate cost control, access to new markets generally promises higher sales
and increased profits. Most existing studies find a positive relationship between the amount of
Chinese OFDI and the market size of host countries (Buckley et al., 2007; Duanmu & Guney, 2009;
Zhang & Daly, 2011; Kolstad & Wiig, 2012; Zhang et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2017). Beyond that,
two groups of scholars find that the market size of host countries is not a significant determinant
(Cheung & Qian, 2008; Huang & Wang, 2011). In Report on Development of China’s Outward
Investment (Ministry of Commerce of China, 2018), taking advantage of international markets is
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Political stability

Technology

Manufacturing
capacity/labor costs

OFDI stock

Contracted projects

Partnership

Natural resource

GDP per capita

Market size

Chinese OFDI outflow

Variables

The percentage of total external debt stocks
to gross national income in host countries

Political stability in host countries

Total patent grants counted by applicants'
origin country

Percentage of industry output to total GDP
divided by GDP per capita in host countries

The amount of Chinese OFDI stock in host
countries (Current USD)

The value of contract fulfilled in host
countries (Current USD)

The level of partnership between host
countries and China (-1 to 3)

The Percentage of total natural resource
rent to GDP in host countries

GDP per capita in host countries (Current
USD)

Annual GDP in host countries (Current
USD)

The amount of Chinese OFDI outflow to
host countries (Current USD)

Proxy

Percentage

Percentile rank

1 Count

Index

10 thousand USD

10 thousand USD

-1 to 3 integer scale

Percentage

1 USD

1 Million USD

10 thousand USD

Unit

World Bank Development
Indicators

The Worldwide Governance
Indicators

World Intellectual Property
Organization Data Center

World Bank Development
Indicators

China Statistical Yearbook

China Statistical Yearbook

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
People's Republic of China

World Bank Development
Indicators

World Bank Development
Indicators

World Bank Development
Indicators

China Statistical Yearbook

Data Source

Table 3. The Operationalization of Variables

Debt level
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OFDI Flow

GDP

Purchasing
power

Partnership

Contracted
projects

OFDI stock

Natural resource

Manufacturing
capacity/
labor costs
Technology

Political stability

OFDI
Flow

0.42260975

GDP

0.29884845

0.19763493

GDP per
capita

0.023207975

0.095531205

0.105604264

Partnership

-0.04106622

0.11383746

0.20265575

Contracted
projects

0.13505099

0.39432602

0.45033454

OFDI stock

-0.13440298

-0.10541204

-0.03928261

Natural
resource

-0.417312434

-0.143321727

-0.075831357

Manufacturing
capacity/labor
costs

0.26298283

0.78595803

0.29667721

Technology

-0.20334354

0.56677073

0.08850119

0.06378245

Political
stability

Table 4. Correlation Matrix

1

1

1

0.03683079

-0.24990065

0.001411828

0.02599106

0.03969717

0.09181018

-0.024486676

0.27729584

-0.2964401

0.04596915

0.18027307

-0.046841975

-0.10727457

-0.51738712

0.42838821

0.12772093

-0.02719863

0.276325052

-0.11974145

0.13236859

1

1

1

1

1

1

1
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mentioned many times as a primary purpose of investing abroad. The almost-saturated domestic
market makes international markets an attractive alternative source of revenue growth. Both
existing studies on Chinese OFDI and the top-level design of Chinese OFDI by the Chinese
government make us expect a positive relationship between the amount of Chinese OFDI and the
market size of host countries.
Among the studies on Chinese OFDI, both GDP in constant US dollars and GDP in current
US dollars are used as proxies for market size. The data on Chinese OFDI flows and Chinese
contracted projects are only available in current US dollars. We use the GDP of host countries in
current US dollars as a proxy for market size in order to make this proxy consistent with the others.
Control variable 2: GDP per capita
GDP per capita is also related to the market-seeking motivation of Chinese OFDI and helps
distinguish whether Chinese OFDI is more likely to go to high-end markets or low-end markets.
In his influential work, Buckley (2007) uses GDP per capita in host countries as a proxy for the
relative market size of host countries and finds that it is not a significant determinant of Chinese
OFDI. We abandon the concept of relative market size and use GDP per capita as a control variable
directly. People living in countries with higher GDP per capita are more likely to afford expensive
high-end imports rather than only consume basic supplies and food. Chinese OFDI is found to be
significantly negative to GDP per capita in developed countries (Cheung & Qian, 2008). The
reason provided by Cheung and Qian is that CMNEs were not able to offer high-end products in
rich countries. However, it is questionable weather this reason is still tenable. CMNEs have
overcome perceptions of low quality and have developed reputable brands. In the top-level design
of Chinese OFDI by the Chinese government, CMNEs are encouraged to transfer comparatively
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advanced production to other countries. CMNEs now have good reason to prefer countries with
higher GDP per capita as OFDI destinations.
This variable is measured by the GDP per capita of host countries in current US dollars. The
reason we adopt current US dollars is the same as above.
Control variable 3: Natural resources
According to the “two markets and two resources” strategy, Chinese OFDI is supposed to
reduce the domestic demand for natural resources by exploiting international natural resources.
Most groups of scholars have established that Chinese OFDI is more likely to go to countries with
more natural resources (Buckley et al., 2007; Huang & Wang, 2011; Kolstad & Wiig, 2012; Zhang
et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2017) and two groups do not (Cheung & Qian, 2008; Duanmu & Guney,
2009). Chinese contractors have been found to be interested in the natural resources of Africa and
Latin America (Feng, Jiang & Yu, 2015; Feng, Gao & Jiang, 2018). The close cooperative
relationship between Chinese investors and Chinese contractors gives us more confidence in the
positive relationship between Chinese OFDI and natural resources.
For natural resources, we use the percentage of total natural resources rents to GDP as a proxy.
Total natural resources rents are the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents, mineral rents,
and forest rents. The higher the percentage is, the more natural resources are available to CMNEs
in a host country.
Independent variable 1: Partnership
The Chinese government has different levels of partnership with host countries. The
partnership variable reflects the level of partnership the Chinese government has with host
countries. To measure it, we have an integer scale from -1 to 3. We assign -1 to the countries that
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do not have diplomatic relations with China. In other words, these countries have diplomatic
relationships with the Republic of China (Taiwan). We assign 0 to the countries that have
diplomatic relations but not any partnership with China. We assign 1 to the countries that have a
basic partnership with China. We assign 2 to the countries that have a strategic partnership with
China. 3 is assigned to the countries that have a strategic cooperative partnership with China. The
level of partnership is decided based on the official description by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of China.
Independent variable 2: Contracted projects
We use the annual value of fulfilled contracted projects as a proxy for contracted projects.
The higher the value is, the more Chinese contracted projects are operated in host countries. We
expect a positive impact of contracted projects on Chinese OFDI.
Independent variable 3: OFDI stock
For OFDI stock, we use the amount of Chinese OFDI stock in host countries as a proxy. It
also is in current US dollars. Using the ratio of Chinese OFDI stock in host countries to total
Chinese OFDI as a proxy for the agglomeration effect, Cheung and Qian (2008) have confirmed
that Chinese OFDI tries to take advantage of the agglomeration effect. Such a proxy is appropriate
only if the total Chinese OFDI stock is still low. With a much higher total OFDI stock than ten
years ago, China now does not need to strictly concentrate its OFDI stock to take advantage of
agglomeration effects. Even one one-thousandth of total Chinese OFDI stock is a huge amount of
money and enough to generate the agglomeration effects of CMNEs.
Independent variable 4: Combination of manufacturing capacity and labor cost
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The percentage of industry output to total GDP is adopted as a proxy for manufacturing
capacity in host countries and GDP per capita is adopted as a proxy for labor costs. A higher
percentage of industry output to total GDP implies larger manufacturing capacity. Higher GDP
per capita implies higher labor costs because it is usual for laborers in richer countries to be paid
better for the same work than those in poorer countries. Using GDP per capita as a proxy for labor
costs could be confusing because it is more often used as the measurement of countries’ affluence.
However, as a proxy, it enables us to measure the labor costs of most countries. Dividing the
percentage of industry output to total GDP by GDP per capita, we get the combination of
manufacturing capacity and labor cost. The final value of this combination is multiplied by one
thousand in our dataset. The higher the value is, the more suitable it is for a country to be the
destination of production transfer.
Independent variable 5: Technology
We use total patent grants counted by applicants' origin country as the proxy for technology.
The more patents granted to a country, the more technologies this country masters. Total (resident
plus non-resident) annual patent registrations in host countries is used as a proxy for the variable
of strategic assets by Buckley (2007), but this variable is found to be insignificant.
Independent variable 6: Political Stability
For political stability, we use the percentile rank on political stability from The Worldwide
Governance Indicators as a proxy. The higher the percentile rank is, the higher political stability a
host country has.
Independent variable 7: Debt Level
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We use the percentage of total external debt to gross national income as a proxy for the debt
level of host countries. The higher the percentage is, the higher the debt level is in host countries.
We admit that we adopt a crude proxy here. The level of debt is also affected by other factors
such as debt maturity and domestic economic growth rate. Long-term debt gives a country more
time to repay a debt and a high economic growth rate often implies a growing debt-paying ability.
In addition, borrowing money for profitable grand projects can even lower the debt level of host
countries in the future.
Our dataset covers the period of time from 2003 to 2016.
We have 175 countries included in our dataset (see Table 5). These countries are sorted into
eight groups. The sorting of the first four groups is based on the identity of OECD-countries and
the availability of debt data. The sorting of the later four groups is based on 2018 gross national
income per capita. The groups are: high income, $12,375 or more; upper middle income, $3,996
to $12,374; lower middle income, $1,026 to $3,995; low income, $1,025 or less (World Bank,
2019). It should be noted that the level of GDP per capital varies greatly among the countries in
the same group.
The division of countries into these eight groups allows us to observe whether Chinese OFDI
has different strategies in different groups of countries. For example, Chinese OFDI could be
attracted to natural resources only in low-income countries and could seek technology only in highincome countries and upper-middle-income countries. Although the group of high-income
countries overlaps with the group of OECD countries, the variable of partnership could be only
significant in the former group. The latter group is composed of countries that are mostly the
traditional allies of the United States and thus opposed to the involvement of the Chinese
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government in OFDI. In addition, such a division gives us an opportunity to do some robustness
analysis.
Group 1: Full samples
This group includes all 175 countries in our dataset.
Group 2: Non-OECD countries with debt data
This group includes the 109 non-OECD countries that make their debt information available
in the World Bank Development Indicators database. The 30 non-OECD countries without
published debt data are not included in this group.
Group 3: OECD countries
This group includes 36 OECD countries.
Group 4: Non-OECD countries
This group includes 139 non-OECD countries. Both the non-OECD countries with debt data
and those without debt data are included.
Group 5: High-income countries
This group is composed of 55 high-income countries.
Group 6: Upper middle-income countries
This group is composed of 53 upper middle-income countries.
Group 7: Lower middle-income countries
This group is composed of 41 lower middle-income countries.
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Table 5: The Eight Groups of Countries

OECD Countries
(36)

Non-OECD
Countries with
Debt Data (109)

Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Chile
Czech
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Argentina
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
Belarus
Belize
Benin
Bolivia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central Africa
Chad
Columbia
Commonwealth of Dominica
Democratic Republic of Congo
Dominica Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Fiji
Gabon
Gambia
Georgia
Ghana

Israel
Italy
Japan
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Slovakia
Slovenia
South Korea
Guinea
Guinea Bissau
Guyana
Honduras
India
Indonesia
Iran
Ivory Coast
Jamaica
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kyrgyzstan
Laos
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Macedonia
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Nepal
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Pakistan
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Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
Spain
Sweden

Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Republic of Congo
Romania
Russia
Rwanda
Saint Lucia
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Salvador
Samoa
Sao Tome and Principe
Senegal
Serbia
Sierra Leone
Solomon Islands
South Africa
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Tonga
Tunisia
Turkmenistan
Uganda
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
Venezuela
Vietnam
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Other Non-OECD
Countries (30)

High-Income
Countries (55)

Upper MiddleIncome Countries
(53)

Lower MiddleIncome Countries
(41)

Grenada
Guatemala
Antigua and Barbuda
Bahamas
Bahrain
Barbados
Bermuda
Brunei
Croatia
Cyprus
Djibouti
Equatorial Guinea
Antigua and Barbuda
Australia
Austria
Bahamas
Bahrain
Barbados
Belgium
Bermuda
Brunei
Canada
Chile
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Albania
Algeria
Argentina
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Belize
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Columbia
Commonwealth of Dominica
Dominica Republic
Ecuador
Equatorial Guinea
Fiji
Gabon
Bangladesh
Bolivia
Cambodia
Cameroon

Panama
Papua and Guinea
Iraq
Kiribati
Kuwait
Libya
Malta
Marshall Islands
Namibia
Oman
Palau
Qatar
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Kuwait
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Oman
Palau
Panama
Poland
Georgia
Grenada
Guatemala
Guyana
Iran
Iraq
Jamaica
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Lebanon
Libya
Macedonia
Malaysia
Maldives
Marshall Islands
Mauritius
Mexico
Namibia
Kyrgyzstan
Laos
Lesotho
Mauritania
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Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saudi Arabia
Seychelles
Singapore
Suriname
Swaziland
Trinidad and Tobago
Tuvalu
United Arab Emirates
Uruguay
Portugal
Qatar
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saudi Arabia
Seychelles
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia
South Korea
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Trinidad and Tobago
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay

Paraguay
Peru
Romania
Russia
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Saint Lucia
Samoa
Serbia
South Africa
Sri Lanka
Suriname
Thailand
Tonga
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Tuvalu
Venezuela
Salvador
Sao Tome and Principe
Senegal
Solomon Islands

Low-Income
Countries (26)

Cape Verde
Djibouti
Egypt
Ghana
Honduras
India
Indonesia
Ivory Coast
Kenya
Kiribati
Afghanistan
Benin
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Central Africa
Chad
Democratic Republic of Congo
Eritrea
Ethiopia

Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
Myanmar
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Pakistan
Papua and Guinea
Philippines
Republic of Congo
Gambia
Guinea
Guinea Bissau
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mozambique
Nepal

Sudan
Swaziland
Tunisia
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
Vietnam
Zambia
Zimbabwe
Niger
Rwanda
Sierra Leone
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Yemen

Group 8: Low-income countries
This group is composed of 26 low-income countries.
5.2 Equations and Models
This dissertation has the following two equations:
ChineseOFDIit = α + β1(Market size)it + β2(GDP per capita)it + β3(Natural resources)it +
β4(Partnership)it + β5(Contracted projects)it + β6(OFDI Stock)it + β7(Manufacturing capacity/labor
cost)it + β8 (Technology)it + β9(Political stability)it + εit
ChineseOFDIit = α + β1(Market size)it + β2(GDP per capita)it + β3(Natural resources)it +
β4(Partnership)it + β5(Contracted projects)it + β6(OFDI Stock)it + β7(Manufacturing capacity/labor
cost)it + β8(Technology)it + β9 Political stability)it + β10(Debt level)it + εit
The difference between these two equations is that we introduce the debt level of host
countries as an independent variable to the second equation. To estimate these two equations, we
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Table 6: The Regression Results for Full Samples
Pooled Regression
Fixed Effect
Random Effect
2003 - 2016
2003 - 2016
2003 -2016
0.0001621
0.000919 ***
0.00016538 ***
Market Size
(0.00001599)
(0.000079)
(0.000019029)
0.2794 ***
0.6026 **
0.3061 ***
GDP per capita
(0.08288)
(0.305)
(0.09869)
-109.8
387.68
-67.055
Natural Resources
(102.7)
(278.51)
(121.08)
825.6
7777.5 **
1399.7
Partnership
(1332)
(3099.7)
(1553.2)
0.1058 ***
0.0551 ***
0.10569 ***
Contracted Projects
(0.0147)
(0.0204)
(0.015839)
0.0274 ***
0.0141***
0.025962 ***
OFDI Stock
(0.0016)
(0.0016)
(0.0015791)
Manufacturing capacity/
125.2 *
124.26
125.84
labor costs
(71.47)
(126.08)
(81.034)
-0.1406 *
1.105 ***
-0.08289
Technology
(0.07265)
(0.24)
(0.086996)
99.9 *
27.924
95.278
Political Stability
(59.69)
(144.64)
(69.519)
Number of Observations
2450
2450
2450
R Square
0.2991
0.25735
0.25838
Adjusted R Square
0.2965
0.19738
0.25564
Pooled Regression
Fixed Effect
Random Effect
2012 - 2016
2012 - 2016
2012 - 2016
0.0004411 ***
0.0015378 ***
0.00045147***
Market Size
(0.00003869)
(0.00037613)
(0.000041391)
0.3117
0.32812
GDP per capita
0.33518 (1.3678)
(0.1956)
(0.21309)
-223
870.8
-202.98
Natural Resources
(295.4)
(1054.7)
(319.39)
522.9
23205 **
779.57
Partnership
(2947)
(10613)
(3188)
0.1089 ***
0.077023
0.10638 ***
Contracted Projects
(0.02789)
(0.071652)
(0.029918)
0.01258 ***
0.0036272
0.011024 ***
OFDI Stock
(0.002677)
(0.0026317)
(0.0026298)
Manufacturing capacity/
389.7
-582.66
376.06
labor costs
(269.7)
(1257.2)
(293.17)
-0.5221 ***
2.2172 *
-0.5267 ***
Technology
(0.154)
(1.3407)
(0.16784)
285.3 *
-801.18
266.53
Political Stability
(153.2)
(539.15)
(165.81)
Number of Observations
875
875
875
R Square
0.3844
0.08256
0.34376
Adjusted R Square
0.378
-0.16045
0.33693
Chi(9)2 = 280.13 in the Hausman test for the full sample 2003 - 2016 group. Random effect model is thus rejected.
***significant at 0.01 level; ** significant at 0.05 level; * significant at 0.1 level
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try to use pooled ordinary least squares regression, fixed effect regression, and random effect
regression.
5.3 Empirical Results
The results for the group of full samples are presented in Table 6. In the pooled ordinary least
squares regression, GDP per capita is significantly positive as a control variable and four of the
six independent variables are significantly positive. These independent variables are contracted
projects, OFDI stock, the combination of manufacturing capacity and labor costs, and political
stability. Technology is a significantly negative independent variable and partnership is irrelevant.
The results from pooled ordinary least squares regression give some support to our hypotheses
related to contracted projects, OFDI stock, the combination of manufacturing capacity and labor
costs, and political stability.
However, the most suitable regression method for the two equations should be fixed effect
regression or random effect regression because our dataset is panel data. To decide which one is
preferable between fixed effect regression and random effect regression, we run a Hausman test.
The result of the Hausman test is shown at the bottom of Table 6. Random effect regression is
rejected by the Hausman test. Therefore, fixed effect regression is the most preferable regression
method and we will focus on the results from fixed effect regression.
In the fixed effect regression for the group of full samples, four of the six independent
variables are significantly positive. Chinese OFDI is more likely to go to countries with a higher
level of partnership with China, more Chinese contracted projects, more Chinese OFDI stock, and
more advanced technology. The combination of manufacturing capacity and labor costs and
political stability are two irrelevant independent variables. It could take a much longer time for
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CMNEs to set up overseas factories for the purpose of production transfer than to acquire or merge
with foreign enterprises for the purpose of overseas technology acquisition. Hypotheses 1, 2, 3 and
5 are supported by the results of fixed effect regression for the group of full samples. By contrast,
hypotheses 4 and 6 are not supported. In addition, Chinese OFDI is more directed to countries with
larger market size and higher GDP per capita but not more natural resources.
The results of fixed effect regression for the other seven groups of samples are presented
together with those for the group of full samples in Table 7. We now discuss the results for each
of these seven groups of samples. In the group of non-OECD countries with debt data, natural
resources is significantly positive as a control variable. Contracted projects and OFDI stock are
significantly positive as independent variables. Debt level is an irrelevant independent variable
and the result of debt level does not support hypothesis 7. The results for the group of non-OECD
countries are not very different from those for the last group. Natural resources and OFDI stock
remain significantly positive but contracted projects turns to be irrelevant. The group of nonOECD countries with debt data is mostly composed of lower middle-income and low-income
countries. By contrast, there are more upper middle-income countries and even high-income
countries in the group of non-OECD countries. Chinese contracted projects in these upper middleincome countries and high-income countries may not have a positive impact on the local
investment environment as strong as those in lower middle-income countries and low-income
countries. The results for the group of OECD countries are quite different from those for the former
two groups. Market size is significantly positive as a control variable. Contracted projects, OFDI
stock, and the combination of manufacturing capacity and labor costs are significantly positive as
independent variables and therefore the result of these variables give some support to hypotheses
2, 3, and 4. The results for the group of high-income countries are similar to those for the group of
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Contracted
Projects

Partnership

Natural
Resources

GDP per
capita

Market Size

0.0141***
(0.0016)

0.0551 ***
(0.0204)

7777.5 **
(3099.7)

387.68
(278.51)

0.6026 **
(0.305)

0.000919 ***
(0.000079)

Full Sample

0.11495 ***
(0.00784)

0.0269 ***
(0.009564)

303.18
(1425)

579.53 ***
(120.87)

0.34635
(0.53609)

0.000045344
(0.000060839)

Non-OECD
with Debt

0.165111 ***
(0.00512)

0.0029418
(0.0096211)

-863.23
(1564.8)

515.89 ***
(121.16)

0.008094
(0.214)

-0.000032495
(0.000063753)

Non-OECD

0.0085915 ***
(0.0031543)

0.52555 **
(0.23319)

14117
(12740)

-445.12
(5175.4)

0.28677
(0.80556)

0.0012283 ***
(0.00019599)

OECD

0.011244 ***
(0.0027212)

0.19664 **
(0.077825)

24860 **
(9803.4)

790.54
(1395.7)

0.57781
(0.58977)

0.0012369 ***
(0.00015975)

High-Income

0.11393 ***
(0.01308)

0.029485
(0.018644)

907.78
(2891.4)

731.78 ***
(236.9)

0.03215
(0.76782)

0.00003745
(0.000094148)

Upper MiddleIncome

0.12169 ***
(0.0083441)

0.028645 ***
(0.0095375)

-491.75
(1403.7)

549.03 ***
(120.4)

-0.97216
(1.4329)

0.000050806
(0.000069825)

Lower MiddleIncome

0.021748 *
(0.012928)

0.018272 **
(0.0088378)

-1403 *
(800.52)

198.37 ***
(55.558)

1.1318
(1.4251)

0.001498
(0.00099648)

Low-Income

8+

6+

2+, 1-

5+

1+

3+

Times of being
Significant

Table 7: The Regression Results for Eight Groups of Countries

OFDI Stock

1.105 ***
(0.24)

124.26
(126.08)
-0.039714
(1.3824)

8.6433
(5.7372)

30.176
(66.727)

-0.86253
(1.5847)

17.762
(55.04)

-436.01
(802.38)

0.45181
(0.49156)

17314 *
(10419)

-21.148
(526.53)

0.48866
(0.42816)

12583*
(6445.7)

-41.392
(121.24)

0.18691
(2.2445)

-8.61
(270.08)

67.997
(68.995)

-0.89195
(1.4684)

-30.181
(74.369)

-7.6448
(33.821)

-44.676 **
(17.966)

-50.62 ***
(19.362)

0

1+, 1-

2+, 1-

Manufacturing
capacity/
labor costs
Technology
1.9708
(6.7789)

0.25735

2450

0.17012

0.23433

1526

0.39072

0.43677

1946

0.24981

0.31543

504

0.23374

0.29652

770

0.085721

0.16099

742

0.46881

0.51423

574

0.19127

0.26701

364

0

27.924
(144.64)

0.19738

-4.5761
(9.9197)

Political
Stability
Debt Level
Number of
Observations
R Square
Adjusted R
Square

***significant at 0.01 level; ** significant at 0.05 level; * significant at 0.1 level
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OECD countries. The primary difference is that partnership turns out to be significantly positive
in the group of high-income countries. Overlapping with the group of high-income countries, the
group of OECD countries is mostly composed of the traditional allies of the United States and may
thus limit the role of China’s partnership with host countries. It is a little surprising that Chinese
OFDI is attracted to countries with a combination of larger manufacturing capacity and lower labor
costs in the groups of OECD countries and high-income countries. Production transfer to these
groups of countries requires high value-added production to cover the high labor costs in these
countries. The research and development capacity of CMNEs could be larger than we expect.
Chinese contracted projects in OECD countries and high-income countries may not improve the
local investment environment greatly but target CMNEs’ demands well. In the groups of upper
middle-income countries and lower middle-income countries, natural resources and OFDI stock
are significantly positive. Contracted projects is a significantly positive variable in the group of
lower middle-income countries but not the group of higher middle-income countries. The results
for the group of low-income countries are quite different from those for the other seven groups.
Natural resources, contracted projects, and OFDI stock are significantly positive in this group.
However, we get three significantly negative independent variables in this group. They are
partnership, the combination of manufacturing capacity and labor costs, and technology. The
Chinese government may not push CMNEs to the austere investment environment provided by
low-income countries. Low income countries are obviously the destinations for CMNE to transfer
production and the sources for CMNEs acquire technology.
The division of countries allows us to determine whether CMNEs adopt different strategies
in different countries. CMNEs are seeking larger market size and the combination of larger
manufacturing capacity and lower labor costs in the group of OECD countries and high-income

78

countries. It seems that CMNEs not only intend to sell more products to rich countries but also try
to produce these products locally. By contrast, CMNEs are more attracted to countries with more
natural resources only in the groups of non-OECD countries with data, non-OECD countries, upper
middle-income countries, lower middle-income countries, and lower-income countries.
The division of countries into eight groups also allows us to get some ideas about the
robustness of our variables. OFDI stock, contracted projects and natural resources are three robust
variables. They have a significantly positive relationship with Chinese OFDI in most groups of
countries. By contrast, the other two control variables and five independent variables are less
robust. These mixed results of control variables and independent variables could be caused by
CMNEs’ different strategies in different countries.
In general, our empirical results more or less give support to six of the seven hypotheses.
Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and 5 are supported by the results of fixed effect regression for the group of
full samples. Chinese OFDI is more likely to go to countries that have a higher level of partnership
with China, more Chinese contracted projects, more Chinese OFDI stock, and more advanced
technologies. Hypothesis 4 is supported by the results of fixed effect regression for the group of
OECD countries and high-income countries. Chinese OFDI is more likely to go to countries with
a combination of higher manufacturing capacity and lower labor costs among OECD countries and
high-income countries. Hypothesis 6 is only supported by the results of ordinary least squares
regression for the group of full samples. It could be arbitrary to conclude that Chinese OFDI prefers
countries with higher political stability. The results of fixed effect regression for the group of nonOECD countries with debt data do not support hypothesis 7. Chinese OFDI is not more likely to
go to countries with higher debt level.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
China has been one of the largest global investors and the footprints of CMNEs have been
almost everywhere in the world. Despite the success achieved by CMNEs, CMNEs’ going abroad
has not been getting easier and easier. CMNEs have been losing traditional cost advantage because
of the increasing domestic operation cost and drawing hostility from protectionists in foreign
markets.
To make the further internationalization of CMNEs smoother, the Chinese government tries
to make a top-level design for CMNEs’ OFDI. The huge influence of the Chinese government on
CMNEs makes it possible that the top-level design could be well carried out by CMNEs. The toplevel design for CMNEs is mainly reflected in the BRI and Made in China 2025. The BRI is a
national strategy which is supposed to make China and participating countries connected more
closely in terms of transportation, policy coordination, economic cooperation, etc. The
international market and resources are more accessible to CMNEs than before because of the BRI.
Made in China 2025 gives a priority to the development of manufacturing industry and a guide
about how the whole Chinese society could support the CMNEs in manufacturing industry
improving their international competitiveness and taking advantage of international market and
resources.
The essence of the top-level design for CMNEs’ OFDI is a reciprocal relationship between
the Chinese government’s political benefits and CMNEs’ economic benefits and the role of an
organizer played by the Chinese government in that reciprocal relationship. We argue that taking
advantage of such a reciprocal relationship and the role played by the Chinese government could
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be an important motivation for Chinese OFDI. We generalize seven situations in which CMNEs’
OFDI could benefit from the reciprocal relationship and the role of the Chinese government. These
situations include: CMNEs make OFDI in countries that are friendly to the Chinese government;
CMNEs make OFDI in countries that have more Chinese contracted projects; CMNEs make OFDI
in countries that have more Chinese OFDI stock; CMNEs make OFDI in countries that are suitable
for production transfer; CMNEs make OFDI in countries that are good at technology development;
CMNEs make OFDI in countries that are politically stable; and, finally, CMNEs make OFDI in
countries that have difficulty in debt repayment. According to these situations, we derive seven
hypotheses to test to what extent CMNEs take advantage of their reciprocal relationship with the
Chinese government and the role of an organizer played by the Chinese government. We find that
Chinese OFDI is more attracted to countries with a higher level of partnership with China, more
Chinese contracted projects, more Chinese OFDI stock and more advanced technologies. We
notice that Chinese OFDI has different strategies in different groups of countries. Chinese OFDI
is more likely to go to countries with the combination of a higher manufacturing capacity and
lower labor cost among OECD countries among developed countries. Chinese OFDI is more likely
to go to countries with more natural resources among middle-income countries and low-income
countries. We do not find evidence of Chinese OFDI’s preference to countries with higher political
stability and higher debt level. In general, our findings give some support to our argument that
CMNEs take advantage of their reciprocal relationship with the Chinese government and the role
of an organizer played by the Chinese government.
This dissertation makes distributions in the following three aspects. Firstly, it is the first study
to investigate Chinese OFDI at national level, industrial level and firm level with a multilevel
framework. We discuss China’s OFDI-related national strategy, China’s OFDI-related industrial
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policy, CMNEs’ entry model and the financial structure of Chinese OFDI after an introduction to
the international circumstances and the domestic situation of Chinese OFDI. Although CMNEs’
overseas activities are required to be consistent with the top-level design by the Chinese
government, CMNEs reserve their decision rights on many issues such as the entry model and the
financial form of OFDI. National-level, industry-level, and firm-level analysis deliver a whole
picture of Chinese OFDI together. Secondly, the hypotheses of this dissertation are not simply
derived from conventional OFDI theories as those in existing studies. We argue that taking
advantage of a reciprocal relationship between the Chinese government’s political benefits and
CMNEs’ economic benefits and the role of an organizer played by the Chinese government in the
reciprocal relationship could be an important motivation for Chinese OFDI. From such a
relationship and role, we derive the hypotheses of this dissertation. The testing results of these
hypotheses support that CMNEs have been enjoying an exclusive advantage in international
competition. Thirdly, this dissertation not only argues against existing studies but also discusses
some popular topics relating to Chinese OFDI such as debt trap and national security. From the
entry model and investment form chosen by CMNEs and the official documents published by the
Chinese government, we find solid reasons for CMNEs to prefer political stability rather than
political instability. The form of OFDI preferred by CMNEs is dependent on long-term benefits,
which require a stable environment to secure. Besides that, the executives of CMNEs are supposed
to be punished for their ignorance of the political risk in host countries and the capital cost for
CMNEs is not as low as before. Political instability could also lead to the abolishment of planned
OFDI projects once irregular government changes or major regular government changes take place
in host countries. The results of fixed effect regression do not support neither the preference of
CMNEs for countries with higher political stability nor the preference of CMNEs for countries
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with lower political stability. Our findings offer some evidence to two frequently discussed issues
in international society. Chinese OFDI does not prefer countries with higher debt level where debt
traps are more feasible. Therefore, China may not strategically exploit other countries with debt
traps. Chinese OFDI is more likely to go to countries that have more advanced countries. China
seems acquiring overseas technologies effectively by Chinese OFDI.
In addition, this dissertation has policy implications for the following three issues. The first
issue is the relationship between home country governments and domestic MNEs. The reciprocal
relationship between the Chinese government and CMNEs examined in this dissertation is an
example in which the home country government is not simply a supervisor of domestic MNEs. To
cultivate the reciprocal relationship, the Chinese government makes its political benefits
compatible with CMNEs ’economic benefits through the top-level design of Chinese OFDI and
playing the role of an organizer. Such a reciprocal relationship requires the ability of home country
governments to exert huge influence on domestic MNEs and thus may not be applicable to many
countries. Fortunately, what the Chinese government has done should not be the only way for
home country governments to develop a reciprocal relationship with domestic MNEs. For example,
a top-level design of philanthropy could be helpful in developing a reciprocal relationship between
developed country governments and domestic MNEs, especially if those owners or executives of
MNEs really want to make their countries better. The redistribution of MNEs ’profits, especially
monopoly profits, should improve the public profile of MNEs and reduce financial pressures on
governments. The second issue is home country governments’ support to domestic MNEs ’OFDI.
What the Chinese government does for CMNEs ’OFDI could be unrealistic for other home country
governments. Taking the utilization of overseas contracted projects as an example, China has
several of the largest international project contractors in the world, such as China Communications
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Construction Group, Power Construction Corporation of China, China State Construction
Engineering Corporation, and China Railway Construction Corporation. Only a few countries have
capable international project contractors such as the United States, Spain, Germany, France, Japan,
Austria, and India. Even in these countries, governments ’involvement in business could be
unacceptable to the public because of the idea of small government. It is questionable whether
these governments have the political capacity to promote cooperation between these MNEs and
coordinate the interests of all parties in that cooperation. What we can learn from China could be
not what China is doing but making strategy and policy based on national conditions. The third
issue is how should host countries treat Chinese OFDI. Although our finding that Chinese OFDI
does not prefer countries with higher debt level could relieve the accusations about China’s debt
trap to some extent, it is imperative for host country governments to conduct financial assessment
of potential projects, especially large projects. No matter whether foreign experts may distort
intentionally the benefits of potential projects, they are very likely not to be familiar enough with
local conditions to give the most accurate assessment. Another finding of this dissertation is that
Chinese OFDI is more directed to countries that have more advanced technologies. Developed
countries have been more and more cautious about potential threats to national security from
CMNEs in the recent years. It is worth discussing whether the host countries of Chinese OFDI
should forbid or encourage domestic MNEs or institutions to develop a cooperative relationship
with CMNEs on the issue of technology development, especially those host countries with
comparatively advanced technologies. If the current blockade of science and technology from host
country governments fails to stop CMNEs’ technology development, CMNEs will charge a lot for
their own new technologies or will not share these technologies in the future. It is good timing to
develop a cooperative relationship on technology development with CMNEs when CMNEs are
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not overwhelmingly advanced in technology and have shown great potential for technology
development. In practice, some other factors are considered in the decision of whether to develop
cooperative relationships with CMNEs, such as national security and elections, and hinder the
formation of such relationships.
Many future research issues remain for Chinese OFDI. Firstly, the measurement and
construction of variables need to be improved. Other proxies could be used for the variables such
as political instability. The political risk ratings provided by The International Country Risk Guide
is an ideal alternative to measure political stability. It has been used by several groups of scholars
in their research on Chinese OFDI (Buckley et al., 2007; Cheung & Qian; 2008, Liu, Tang, Chen
& Poznanska, 2017). The use of other proxies should not only make the measurement of variables
more precise but also allow us to do more robustness analysis of the adopted models. New
variables could be created to reflect whether a country is suitable to be the destination of production
transfer. The combination of manufacturing capacity and labor costs is quite a crude variable.
Secondly, more efforts could be made to explore the effects of Chinese OFDI on host countries.
For example, it could be meaningful to investigate whether a higher Chinese OFDI stock in a host
country makes this country outperform other countries in economic development. If so, it could
be concluded that the FDI from China is more beneficial to the economic development of host
countries than the FDI from other countries. If not, it implies to host country governments that it
does not make much sense to make concessions to the Chinese government or Chinese investors
in project negotiation. Thirdly, comparative research could be conducted to investigate the
government relationships of U.S. MNEs, European MNEs and Japanese MNEs. The absence of a
home country government could also give an advantage to domestic MNEs in international
competition. Such comparative research may help us explore the optimal level of a home country’s
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involvement in domestic MNEs’ internationalization. Lastly, more attention could be paid to the
cooperative relationship between CMNEs. We discuss the agglomeration effects of CMNEs in this
dissertation. Creating the agglomeration effects is only one of the patterns in which CMNEs
cooperate with each other to increase international competitiveness. The merger of the two largest
high-speed rail markers in China, China North Railway and China South Railway, was completed
in 2015 to avoid price competition between them in the international market. Such a merger is
another pattern for CMNEs to cooperate with each other: internalization for internationalization.
The merger of the two largest shipbuilding enterprises, China State Shipbuilding Corporation and
China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, is being pursued for the same reason. Setting up
overseas joint ventures is another pattern for CMNEs to cooperate with each other. The pattern
could vary based on whether the potential cooperation is between state-owned CMNEs, private
CMNEs, or state-owned CMNEs and private CMNEs. Our understating of Chinese OFDI should
benefit greatly from the exploration of the different patterns of CMNEs’ internationalization.
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